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Introduction	  	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  problems	  faced	  by	  residents	  informed	  that	  their	  estate	  is	  being	  considered	  
for	   ‘regeneration’	   is	   the	  disinformation	   they	  are	  given	  by	   the	   local	   authority	   or	  housing	  
association	  implementing	  the	  process.	  This	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  council	  officers	  who	  run	  
the	   unelected	   Resident	   Engagement	   Panels	   and	   Steering	   Groups	   formed	   to	   persuade	  
residents	   of	   the	   benefits	   of	   regeneration;	   by	   the	   professional	   consultants	   employed	   to	  
manufacture	  resident	  consensus	  for	  what	  they	  are	  told	  will	  happen;	  by	  the	  architects	  who	  
visualise	  the	  promises	  of	  what	  regeneration	  will	  mean	  for	  residents;	  and	  ultimately	  by	  the	  
property	   developers	   who	   will	   build	   the	   new	   development.	   For	   whatever	   residents	   are	  
initially	   told	  about	   ‘regeneration’,	  on	  estates	  built	  on	  London’s	  highly	   lucrative	   land	   this	  
invariably	   means	   the	   demolition	   of	   the	   existing	   estate,	   the	   redevelopment	   of	   new	  
properties	  at	  greatly	  increased	  densities,	  and	  the	  privatisation	  of	  the	  management	  of	  the	  
new	  development.	  
	  
This	  problem	  of	  disinformation,	  however,	  isn’t	  confined	  to	  residents.	  Housing	  campaigners	  
trying	   to	   resist	   the	   demolition	   of	   residents’	   homes	   share	   the	   same	   misunderstandings	  
about	   the	   costs	   of	   estate	   regeneration.	   As	   a	   result,	   these	   campaigns	   of	   resistance	   are	  
almost	  entirely	  confined	  to	  ethical	  arguments	  about	  the	  right	  of	  the	  estate	  community	  to	  
continue	  to	  exist.	  These	  arguments	  are	  important,	  but	  they	  are	  of	  no	  concern	  to	  the	  agents	  
of	  regeneration:	  neither	  to	  the	  developers	  after	  the	  land	  residents’	  homes	  are	  built	  on,	  nor	  
to	   the	   council	   undertaking	   the	   process	   of	   moving	   them	   off	   it.	   The	   registered	   social	  
landlord,	   whether	   local	   authority	   or	   housing	   association,	   will	   make	   gestures	   of	  
appeasement	   towards	   those	  rights	   right	  up	   to	   the	  moment	  residents	  are	   forcibly	  evicted	  
from	  their	  homes;	  but	  those	  arguments	  will	  have	  little	  or	  no	  influence	  on	  what	  gets	  built	  
on	  the	  land	  cleared	  of	  the	  demolished	  homes.	  What	  determines	  that	  is	  one	  thing,	  and	  one	  
thing	  only:	  the	  financial	  costs	  of	  demolishing	  and	  redeveloping	  estates.	  
	  
It	  is	  important,	  therefore,	  that	  residents	  and	  campaigners	  understand	  these	  costs,	  and	  can	  
base	   their	  resistance	   to	   the	  estate	  regeneration	  programme	  that	   is	  clearing	  the	   land	   for	  
London’s	   property	   boom	   not	   only	   on	   arguments	   about	   ethics,	   but	   also	   on	   a	   clear	  
understanding	   of	   what	   will	   result	   from	   the	   continued	   demolition	   of	   the	   city’s	   housing	  
estates	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   a	   crisis	   of	   housing	   affordability.	   Current	   policy	   for	   London’s	  
Conservative,	   Labour	   and	   Liberal	  Democrat	   councils,	   the	  Greater	   London	  Authority	   and	  
the	   UK	   Government,	   is	   to	   use	   ‘regeneration’	   as	   a	   Trojan	   Horse	   for	   demolition	   and	  
redevelopment.	  But	   the	   financial	   figures	   show	  that	   the	  cost	  of	  demolition,	   compensation	  
for	   leaseholders	   and	   tenants,	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   new-­‐build	   dwellings,	   is	   so	   high	   in	  
today’s	   housing	   market	   that	   the	   resulting	   redevelopment	   will	   overwhelmingly	   be	  
composed	  of	  properties	  for	  private	  sale,	  with	  a	  hugely	  reduced	  number	  of	  homes	  for	  social	  
rent,	   increased	   rental	   and	   service	   charges	   for	   existing	   council	   tenants,	   and	   enormously	  
increased	  sale	  prices	  and	  reduced	  tenancy	  rights	  for	  leaseholders.	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It	   is	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   understanding	   of	   these	   costs	   that	   over	   the	   past	   three	   years	  
Architects	   for	  Social	  Housing	  has	  developed	   its	  design	  alternatives	   to	  demolition	   for	   five	  
London	  housing	  estates,	  including	  the	  Knight’s	  Walk	  and	  Central	  Hill	  estates	  in	  Lambeth,	  
the	   West	   Kensington	   and	   Gibbs	   Green	   estates	   in	   Hammersmith	   and	   Fulham,	   and	   the	  
Northwold	  estate	  in	  Hackney.	  Each	  of	  our	  design	  proposals	  increased	  the	  housing	  capacity	  
on	  the	  estate	  by	  between	  35	  and	  50	  per	  cent	  without	  demolishing	  a	  single	  existing	  home	  or	  
evicting	  a	  single	  resident.	  The	  funds	  raised	  from	  the	  market	  sale	  and	  rent	  of	  around	  half	  of	  
the	  new	  builds	  meant	  the	  other	  half	  were	  able	  to	  be	  allocated	  as	  homes	  for	  social	  rent.	  And	  
the	   sale	   and	   rent	   revenues	   from	   the	   new	   builds	   generated	   the	   funds	   to	   refurbish	   and	  
improve	  the	  current	  estate	  up	  to	  the	  Decent	  Homes	  Standard	  and	  higher.	  Because	  of	  this,	  
the	  ASH	  model	  of	  estate	  regeneration	  through	  refurbishment	  and	  infill	  new	  development	  is	  
the	  most	  socially	  beneficial	  and	  environmentally	  sustainable	  option	  to	  address	  the	  crisis	  of	  
housing	  affordability	  in	  London;	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  only	  financial	  option	  that	  doesn’t	  result	  
in	  the	  social	  cleansing	  of	  existing	  residents	  from	  their	  estate	  and	  the	  mass	  loss	  of	  homes	  for	  
social	  rent	  that	  is	  being	  implemented	  by	  the	  estate	  regeneration	  programme	  in	  its	  current	  
form.	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Part	  One:	  Gains	  and	  Losses	  
	  
	  	  Demonstrating	   this	   to	   be	   the	   case,	   however,	   requires	   arguments	   not	   relying	   on	   the	  promises	  of	  the	  councils	  and	  housing	  associations	  implementing	  estate	  redevelopment,	  but	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  previous	  and	  current	  estate	  regeneration	  schemes,	  and	  the	  housing	  policy	  under	  which	  they	  were,	  and	  are	  currently	  being,	  implemented.	  
I	  want	  to	  begin	  this	  report	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  estate	  regeneration	  by	  looking	  at	  some	  of	  the	  more	  famous	  estate	  regeneration	  schemes	  in	  London,	  those	  which	  are	  some	  way	  along	  the	  process,	   and	   for	  which	   the	   figures,	   therefore,	   are	   available.	   Estate	  demolition	   and	  redevelopment	  is	  a	  long	  process.	  It	  takes	  years	  to	  complete,	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  larger	  estates,	  decades.	  But	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  results	  of	  their	  ‘regeneration’	  are	  at	  enormous	  odds	  with	  the	  promises	  made	  to	  residents	  by	  the	  landlords	  implementing	  them,	  and	  the	  reasons	  they	  gave	  for	  doing	  so.	  
This	   first	  set	  of	   three	  slides	   looks	  at	  six	  estate	  regeneration	  schemes.	  The	   first	   four	  of	  these,	  the	  Ferrier	  estate	  in	  Kidbrooke,	  the	  Woodberry	  Down	  estate	  in	  Manor	  Park,	  the	  Heygate	  estate	  in	  the	  Elephant	  and	  Castle,	  and	  the	  Aylesbury	  estate	  in	  Camberwell,	  are	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still	  in	  progress.	  The	  fifth	  scheme,	  Myatts	  Field	  North	  estate	  in	  Brixton,	  is	  complete.	  And	  the	  last	  estate,	  Central	  Hill	  in	  Crystal	  Palace,	  has	  been	  condemned	  for	  demolition.	  
On	  the	  left	  side	  of	  this	  first	  slide	  are	  the	  number	  of	  homes	  that	  have	  been	  or	  are	  to	  be	  demolished	  (indicated	  in	  light	  grey)	  in	  each	  scheme;	  and	  on	  the	  right	  are	  the	  number	  of	  homes	  to	  be	  built	  in	  the	  new	  development	  (indicated	  in	  black),	  usually	  under	  a	  different	  name.	   One	   measure	   of	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   estates	   are	   being	   regenerated	   as	   private	  developments	  for	  a	  clientele	  of	  home	  owners	  and	  property	  investors	  rather	  than	  council	  estates	  for	  people	  in	  housing	  need	  is	  that	  if	  the	  estate	  is	  in	  Inner	  London	  it	  tends	  to	  be	  renamed	  ‘Quarter’	  or	  ‘Park’,	  and	  if	  it’s	  in	  Outer	  London	  it	  tends	  to	  be	  renamed	  ‘Village’	  or	  ‘Orchard’.	  
So,	   the	   Ferrier	   estate	   had	   1,906	   council	   homes	   demolished;	   while	   Kibrooke	   Village,	  which	  is	  replacing	  it,	  will	  have	  4,763	  properties.	  Woodberry	  Down	  will	  have	  1,980	  of	  its	  council	   homes	   demolished;	   while	   the	   new	   Woodberry	   Down	   development	   will	   have	  5,557	   properties.	   The	   Heygate	   estate	   had	   1,214	   council	   homes	   demolished;	   while	  Elephant	  Park	  will	  have	  2,535	  properties.	  The	  Aylesbury	  estate	  will	  have	  2,704	  council	  homes	   demolished;	   while	   the	   new	   Aylesbury	   development	   will	   have	   around	   4,200	  properties.	   The	   Myatts	   Field	   North	   estate	   had	   306	   council	   homes	   demolished;	   while	  Oval	  Quarter	  has	  808	  properties.	  Central	  Hill	  will	  have	  456	  council	  homes	  demolished;	  with	  the	  number	  of	  dwellings	  on	  the	  new	  development	  not	  yet	  determined,	  but	  will	  be	  anything	  up	  to	  and	  even	  exceeding	  1,530	  properties.	  
I’m	   not	   going	   to	   go	   into	   the	   details	   of	   what	   the	   tenure	   breakdown	   of	   the	   new	  developments	   is	   here.	   You	   may	   read	   about	   them	   in	   ASH’s	  individual	   case	   studies	   of	  these	   and	   other	   schemes,	   which	   are	   published	   on	   our	   blog.	   But	   by	   referring	   to	   the	  demolished	   dwellings	   as	   ‘homes’	   and	   the	   new	   dwellings	   as	   ‘properties’,	   I’m	   more	  generally	   indicating	   that	   in	   each	   of	   these	   schemes	   there	   is	   a	  mass	   loss	   of	   homes	   for	  social	  rent,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  council	  homes	  bought	  by	  leaseholders	  under	  the	  Right	  to	  Buy,	  and	   their	  replacement	  overwhelmingly	  with	  properties	   for	  market	  sale	  and	  rent,	  with	  the	  remainder	  so-­‐called	  ‘affordable	  housing’.	  We’ll	  come	  to	  what	  this	  term	  means,	  which	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  lie	  of	  estate	  redevelopment.	  	  All	  of	  these	  schemes,	  it	  should	  be	  noted,	  are	  being	  implemented	  by	  Labour-­‐run	  councils.	  Kibrooke	  Village	   is	   in	  Greenwich;	  Woodberry	  Down	   is	   in	  Hackney;	   the	  Elephant	  Park	  and	  the	  Aylesbury	  are	  in	  Southwark;	  and	  Oval	  Quarter	  and	  Central	  Hill	  are	  in	  Lambeth.	  These	   are	   the	   boroughs	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   London’s	   estate	   regeneration	   programme;	  but	  every	  London	  council	  has	  an	  estate	  regeneration	  programme,	  and	  they	  are	  following	  the	  trail	  cut	  by	  these	  boroughs	  through	  London’s	  council	  housing.	  	  
©Architects	  for	  Social	  Housing	  2018	   7	  
Now,	   as	   we	   can	   see,	   on	   each	   of	   these	   schemes	   the	   increase	   in	   dwellings	   from	   the	  demolished	  homes	  to	  the	  developed	  properties	  is	  considerable,	  between	  two	  and	  three	  times	  as	  much.	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case	  is	  what	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  in	  this	  report.	  
	  	  I	  want	  to	  start	  with	  leaseholders,	  as	  they	  get	  the	  worst	  deal	  out	  of	  estate	  redevelopment.	  For	  this	  reason	  they	  usually	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  residents’	  resistance	  to	  the	  demolition	  of	   their	  homes,	  because	   the	  deals	   they	  are	  offered	   in	  compensation	  are	   so	  bad.	  These	  deals	   are	   changing,	   however,	   and	   I	   want	   to	   go	   back	   over	   the	   regeneration	   schemes	  we’ve	   already	   looked	   at	   to	   see	  what’s	   happened	   on	   them.	   I’ve	   broken	   this	   down	   into	  three	  figures:	  
1. The	  compensation	  leaseholders	  were	  offered	  for	  their	  demolished	  homes	  (indicated	  in	  light	  grey),	  which	  the	  council	  are	  able	  to	  buy	  against	  leaseholder’s	  wishes	  through	  Compulsory	  Purchase	  Orders	  (CPOs);	  2. The	   cost	   of	   a	   shared	   ownership	   deal	   on	   the	   new	  development	   as	   both	   a	   required	  minimum	  25	  per	  cent	  deposit	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey)	  and	  monthly	  rent	  (indicated	  in	  dots);	  3. And	  the	  full	  price	  of	  a	  property	  on	  the	  new	  development	  (indicated	  in	  black).	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Shared	   ownership	  makes	   up	   an	   increasing	   majority	   of	   the	   new	   category	   of	   so-­‐called	  ‘affordable	   housing’,	   which	   all	   three	   political	   parties	   running	   London’s	   councils	   have	  adopted	  as	   the	  official	   replacement	   for	  homes	   for	  social	   rent	   lost	   to	  estate	  demolition	  schemes.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  primary	  deal	  offered	  to	  existing	  leaseholders.	  Shared	  ownership	  means	   the	   buyer	   needs	   a	   25	   per	   cent	   share	   in	   the	   new	   property.	   However,	   this	   only	  gives	  them	  the	  tenancy	  rights	  of	  an	  assured	  tenant.	  They	  don’t	  become	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  property	   until	   they	   have	   purchased	   100	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   shares,	   the	   price	   of	   which	  will	  increase	  with	  the	  value	  of	  the	  property,	  and	  until	  that	  time	  they	  remain	  an	  assured	  tenant.	  Furthermore,	  although	  they	  may	  own	  just	  25	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  property,	   tenants	  are	   liable	   for	  100	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  service	  charges	   for	   the	  maintenance	  of	   the	  building.	  Finally,	  if	  they	  default	  on	  their	  rental	  payments,	  which	  can	  be	  increased	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  landlord,	  shared	  ownership	  tenants	  lose	  not	  only	  their	  home	  but	  also	  their	  down-­‐payment	  on	  the	  property	  as	  well.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  shared	  ownership	  is	  emerging	  as	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  scams	  to	  come	  out	  of	  the	  housing	  crisis	  since	  the	  Right	  to	  Buy.	  	  On	  the	  Ferrier	  estate,	  for	  example,	  the	  regeneration	  of	  which	  began	  back	  in	  1999	  under	  a	   Labour	   government,	   a	   leaseholder	  with	   a	   4-­‐bedroom	  home	  was	   offered	   £85,000	   in	  compensation	   for	   a	   4-­‐bedroom	   home.	   In	   contrast,	   a	   4-­‐bedroom	   home	   on	   Kibrooke	  Village,	  its	  replacement	  built	  by	  the	  Berkeley	  Group,	  costs	  £900,000	  today.	  To	  enter	  into	  a	  shared	  ownership	  deal,	  therefore,	  the	  leaseholder	  needed	  a	  £225,000	  down	  payment,	  £140,000	   more	   than	   he	   was	   offered	   for	   his	   demolished	   home,	   as	   well	   as	   finding	   an	  additional	  £1,550	  per	  month	  in	  rent.	  These	  are	  actual	  figures,	  not	  generalised	  ones,	  and	  accurately	   reflect	   the	   kind	   of	   cowboy	   practices	   that	   prevailed	   when	   the	   estate	  regeneration	  programme	  first	  entered	  its	  current	  form.	  Because	  of	  this,	  few	  if	  any	  of	  the	  leaseholders	   on	   the	   Ferrier	   estate	   purchased	   a	   property	   in	  Kidbrooke	  Village,	   as	  was	  quite	  clearly	  the	  intention.	  	  On	  Woodberry	  Down,	  the	  regeneration	  of	  which	  was	  also	  initiated	  in	  1999,	  things	  were	  marginally	  better.	  Leaseholders	  were	  offered	  £220,000	  for	  their	  demolished	  2-­‐bedroom	  home.	  Equivalent-­‐sized	  properties	  on	  the	  new	  development,	  also	  built	  by	  the	  Berkeley	  Group,	  are	  selling	  for	  £660,000,	  so	  this	  compensation	  covered	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  25	  per	  cent	  share	   in	   the	  new	  property.	  But	   from	  being	  homeowners	  –	  most	  of	  whom	  owned	   their	  property	  outright	  –	  leaseholders	  were	  now	  turned	  into	  assured	  tenants	  who	  had	  to	  find	  on	  average	  £1,150	  per	  month	  in	  rent.	  	  In	   the	  Heygate	   estate	  regeneration	   scheme,	   which	   was	   initiated	   in	   1998,	   the	  leaseholders	  were	   offered	   on	   average	   £120,000	   in	   compensation	   for	   a	   demolished	   2-­‐bedroom	  home;	  while	  a	  2-­‐bedroom	  property	  on	  Trafalgar	  Place,	  the	  first	  redevelopment	  site	   completed	   by	   international	   property	   developers	   Lendlease,	   went	   on	   sale	   for	  £725,000,	   meaning	   leaseholders	   required	   £181,250	   for	   a	   25	   per	   cent	   share,	   an	  additional	  £61,000,	  plus	  £1,250	  rent	  per	  month.	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  On	  Myatts	  Field	  North	  estate,	  the	  regeneration	  of	  which	  began	  in	  2002	  under	  a	  Private	  Finance	   Initiative	  between	  Lambeth	  Living	   and	  a	   consortium	  called	  Regenter	  –	  a	   joint	  venture	   between	   John	   Laing	   Investments	   Ltd	   and	   the	   Pinnacle	   Regeneration	   Group	  –	  leaseholders	   were	   offered	   on	   average	   £114,500	   for	   their	   demolished	   homes.	   2-­‐bedroom	  properties	   on	  Oval	  Quarter,	   the	  new	  development,	   are	   currently	   on	   sale	   for	  £595,000.	   Again,	   this	   means	   the	   £148,750	   required	   for	   a	   25	   per	   cent	   share	   was	   not	  covered	   by	   the	   compensation,	   and	   that	   an	   additional	   £1,025	   per	   month	   rent	   was	  required	   to	  become	  an	  assured	   tenant	  of	   the	  consortium,	   the	  homes	   for	  which	  are	  no	  longer	  managed	  by	  the	  council	  but	  subcontracted	  out	  to	  Pinnacle	  PSG,	  a	  private	  housing	  management	  company,	  which	  has	  been	  unaccountable	  to	  residents	  and	  unresponsive	  to	  the	  numerous	  repairs	  required	  to	  the	  badly-­‐built	  new	  properties.	  This,	  too,	  is	  typical	  of	  the	  new	  developments	  being	  thrown	  up	  on	  London’s	  demolished	  council	  estates.	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When	  we	  get	  to	  the	  regeneration	  of	  the	  Central	  Hill	  estate,	  which	  was	  initiated	  in	  2014	  but	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   demolished,	   Lambeth	   council	   has	   promised	   to	   compensate	  leaseholders	  for	  the	  demolition	  of	  their	  2-­‐bedroom	  homes	  with	  £340,000.	  It’s	  difficult	  to	  establish	   what	   is	   fair	   compensation	   for	   leaseholders’	  homes	   based	   on	   their	   market	  value	  when	  the	  estate	  they	  are	  part	  of	  has	  been	  slated	  for	  demolition,	  and	  councils	  are	  cynical	  about	  using	  this	  loophole	  to	  offer	  leaseholders	  drastically	  reduced	  sums.	  But	  as	  we	  can	  see,	  £340,000	  for	  a	  2-­‐bedroom	  home	  is	  considerably	  more	  than	  the	  sums	  paid	  in	  compensation	   for	   equivalent-­‐sized	   homes	   on	   the	   earlier	   regeneration	   schemes,	   and	  pretty	  close	  to	  their	  actual	  market	  value.	  However,	  these	  are	  as	  yet	  only	  promises,	  and	  Lambeth	   council	   has	   systematically	   reduced	   its	   other	   written-­‐in-­‐stone	   promises	   to	  residents	  into	  hopeful	  principles,	  so	  we	  should	  take	  these	  offers	  with	  a	  pinch	  of	  salt.	  But	  taking	   the	   council	   at	   its	   word,	   a	   2-­‐bedroom	   property	   on	   the	   new	   redevelopment	   is	  currently	   estimated	   to	   go	   on	   sale	   for	   £476,000,	   which	   means	   the	   leaseholder	   can	  purchase	  something	  like	  a	  70	  per	  cent	  share	  in	  the	  new	  property,	  somewhat	  less	  given	  that	  prices	  will	  have	  risen	  in	  the	  5-­‐10	  years	  it	  will	  take	  for	  the	  new	  development	  to	  be	  complete;	  but	   the	  assured	  tenant	  will,	  once	  again,	  have	  to	   find	  an	  additional	  £820	  per	  month	   in	   rent	   and	   service	   charges,	  more	   if	   the	   housing	   association	   running	   the	   new	  development	  chooses	  to	  raise	  it.	  	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  since	  the	  days	  when	  the	  Ferrier	  and	  Heygate	  estates	  were	  almost	  entirely	  socially	   cleansed	  of	   their	   existing	   residents,	   things	  have	  got	   a	   little	  better.	  This	  hasn’t	  happened	  because	  of	  a	  sudden	  wave	  of	  guilt	  overwhelming	  the	  councils	   implementing	  these	   schemes,	   or	   because	   of	   a	   sudden	   input	   of	   funding	   from	   the	   government,	   but	  because	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  residents	  and	  campaigners	  exposing	  and	  opposing	  the	  results	  of	  the	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  of	  estates.	  	  
	  





	  We	   shouldn’t	   forget,	   however,	   that	   shared	   ownership	   does	   not	   mean	   ownership	   but	  assured	  tenancy.	  And,	  just	  as	  importantly,	  whether	  transferred	  to	  a	  housing	  association	  like	  Notting	  Hill	  Genesis	  or	  a	  property	  developer	  like	  Lendlease,	  former	  leaseholders	  are	  now	  private	   tenants,	   and	   their	   landlords	   are	   free	   to	   increase	   service	   charges	   at	   their	  whim.	   Indeed,	  ASH	  has	  been	  sent	  numerous	  examples	  of	  housing	  associations	  such	  as	  Genesis	   evicting	   leaseholders	   from	   their	   homes	   and	   repossessing	   their	   properties	  because	   they	  were	  unable	   to	  pay	   the	  dramatically	   increased	   service	  and	  maintenance	  charges.	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  Most	  residents	  on	  council	  or	  housing	  association	  estates,	  however,	  aren’t	   leaseholders	  but	  tenants,	  and	  it	   is	   the	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  they	  currently	   live	   in	  that	  make	  up	  the	  greatest	   loss	   to	   the	   estate	   regeneration	   programme.	   In	   this	   slide	   I’ve	   laid	   out	   the	  increases	   between	   the	   social	   rent	   homes	   that	   are	   being	   demolished	   and	   the	   various	  affordable	   housing	   and	   market	   rents	   that	   are	   replacing	   them.	   Taking	   the	   London	  borough	  of	  Lambeth	  in	  2017	  as	  our	  example:	  
• Social	  rent	  (indicated	  in	  red)	  for	  a	  2-­‐bedroom	  home	  was	  £135	  per	  week.	  
• London	  Affordable	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  orange),	  which	  was	  recently	  introduced	  by	  the	  London	  Mayor	  as	  a	  new	  category	  of	  affordable	  rent	  designed	  to	  replace	  social	  rent,	   was	   £159	   per	   week	   for	   a	   2-­‐bedroom	   home,	   a	   weekly	   increase	   of	   £24.	  However,	   this	   was	   set	   as	   a	   benchmark	   for	   the	   whole	   of	   London,	   and	   fails	   to	  distinguish	   between,	   for	   example,	   new	   developments	   in	   Lambeth	   and	   Enfield,	  with	   the	   former	   likely	   to	   be	   considerably	   higher	   in	   practice,	   and	   subject	   to	  viability	  assessments	  for	  the	  new	  development.	  
• London	   Living	   Rent	   (indicated	   in	   yellow),	   another	   new	   category	   of	   affordable	  rent,	   is	   set	  at	  a	   third	  of	   the	  median	   income	   in	   the	  borough.	  As	  a	  benchmark	   to	  aim	  for,	  it’s	  proposed	  that	  we	  should	  pay	  no	  more	  than	  a	  third	  of	  our	  income	  on	  accommodation,	  so	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it	  this	  sounds	  like	  a	  good	  deal.	  However,	  if	  you	  live	  in	  the	  Inner	  London	  boroughs	  in	  which	  the	  estate	  regeneration	  programme	  is	   concentrated,	   a	   third	   of	   the	  median	   income	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   far	   higher	   than	   a	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council	  tenant	  and	  their	  family	  can	  afford	  to	  pay.	  In	  Lambeth	  in	  2017	  it	  was	  £213	  per	  week,	  more	  than	  one-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  times	  social	  rent.	  
• Tenancy	  Strategy	  Rent	   (indicated	   in	  green),	  which	   is	  applied	   to	  new	  affordable	  rent	  homes,	  ostensibly	  built	  for	  new	  council	  tenants,	  was	  £265	  per	  week	  for	  a	  2-­‐bedroom	  home,	  nearly	  double	  social	  rent.	  
• Intermediate	  Rent,	  or	  so-­‐called	  Affordable	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  blue),	  which	  is	  set	  by	  the	  Homes	  and	  Community	  Agency	  at	  up	  to	  (and	  rarely	  below)	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  market	   rent,	  was	  £384	  per	  week	   for	  a	  2-­‐bedroom	  home,	   so	  nearly	   three	   times	  social	  rent.	  
• And	   finally,	  Market	  Rent	   (indicated	   in	  purple),	  which	   for	  a	  2-­‐bedroom	  home	   in	  Lambeth	  in	  2017	  was	  £480	  per	  week,	  is	  three-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  time	  social	  rent.	  	  In	   every	   case,	   therefore,	   when	   an	   estate	   is	   demolished	   and	   redeveloped,	   the	   best	   a	  council	  tenant	  can	  hope	  for	  is	  an	  increase	  –	  and	  in	  most	  cases	  a	  considerable	  increase	  –	  in	  their	  rent,	  which	  for	  many	  of	  them	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  prohibit	  them	  from	  returning	  to	   the	   new	   development.	  Moreover,	   in	   every	   estate	   regeneration	   scheme	   ASH	   knows	  about	  responsibility	   for	  the	  affordable	  housing	  provision	  has	  either	  been	  handed	  over	  to	  a	  housing	  association	  or	  will	  be	  developed	  through	  a	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicle	  (SPV)	  acting	   as	   a	  housing	   association.	  This	  means	   that	   the	   council	   tenant	  will	   lose	  what	   for	  most	   of	   them	   is	   their	   secure	   tenancy,	   since	   under	   the	   1988	   Housing	   Act	   housing	  associations	   are	  prohibited	   from	  granting	   secure	   tenancies,	   so	   former	   council	   tenants	  will	  at	  best	  be	  given	  assured	  tenancies,	  with	  all	  the	  loss	  of	  rights	  that	  entails.	  	  These	  are	  considerable.	  The	  rights	  of	  a	  secure	  tenancy	  include	  the	  right	  of	  a	  spouse	  or	  family	  member	   to	  succeed	   to	   the	  council	   tenancy;	   the	  right	  of	  mutual	  exchange	  of	   the	  tenancy	  with	  other	  tenants;	  the	  right	  to	  take	  in	  lodgers	  and	  to	  sublet	  the	  flat;	  the	  right	  to	  repair	  and	  make	  improvements	  to	  their	  home;	  the	  right	  to	  information	  and	  consultation	  from	  the	  landlord;	  the	  right	  to	  buy	  the	  property;	  the	  right	  to	  take	  out	  a	  mortgage	  on	  it;	  and	  the	  right	  to	  manage	  the	  estate	  of	  which	  it	  is	  a	  part.	  There	  are	  also	  far	  more	  stringent	  conditions	   to	   be	   met	   before	   a	   secure	   council	   tenant	   can	   be	   evicted	   by	   the	   landlord.	  Excepting	   the	   right	  of	   a	   spouse	   to	   succeed	   to	   the	   tenancy,	   all	   these	   rights	  will	   be	   lost	  under	  an	  assured	  tenancy	  with	  a	  housing	  association.	  The	  costs	  of	  estate	  redevelopment	  for	  a	  council	  tenant,	  therefore,	  are	  not	  only	  financial	  but	  also	  –	  if	  they	  are	  able	  to	  afford	  those	   increased	   costs	   and	   return	   to	   the	   new	   development	  –	  the	   loss	   of	   their	   tenancy	  rights.	  
Part	  Two:	  The	  Social	  Costs	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  Given	   these	   changes,	   which	   are	   consequent	   upon	   a	   regeneration	   scheme	   that	  demolishes	   and	   redevelops	   the	   estate,	   we	   can	   now	   look	   at	   how	   the	   process	   of	  regeneration	   proceeds.	   To	   do	   so	   I	   want	   to	   distinguish	   between	   what	   residents	   are	  promised	  by	  the	  council	  or	  housing	  association,	  what	  is	  lost	  as	  the	  process	  unfolds,	  and	  what	   are	   the	   realities	  of	   the	   resulting	  development.	  To	  make	   this	   complex	  process	   as	  clear	   as	   possible,	   I’m	   going	   to	   use	   a	   hypothetical	   example	   of	   an	   estate	   of	   100	  homes.	  Compared	  to	  the	  actual	  estate	  regeneration	  schemes	  we’ve	  looked	  at	  that’s	  a	  relatively	  small	  estate,	  but	  the	  proportions	  at	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  process	  are	  the	  same,	  whether	  they	  apply	  to	  an	  estate	  of	  100	  homes,	  500	  homes,	  or	  1,000	  or	  more	  homes.	  
On	  this	  hypothetical	  estate,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  regeneration	  process	  –	  which	  takes	  place	   long	   before	   residents	   are	   notified	   of	   the	   council’s	   or	   housing	   association’s	  intentions	  –	  70	  of	  the	  homes	  are	  for	  council	  or	  what	  is	  now	  called	  social	  rent	  (indicated	  in	  red).	  These	  colours	  are	  cross-­‐referenced	  to	  the	  previous	  slide	  showing	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  different	  social,	  affordable	  and	  market	  rent	  levels.	  The	  remaining	  30	  homes	  on	  the	  estate	  are	  leasehold	  (indicated	  in	  light	  grey),	  purchased	  under	  the	  Right	  to	  Buy;	  and	  of	  these	  10	  have	  been	  let	  for	  market	  rent	  (indicated	  in	  purple).	  This	  may	  seem	  high,	  but	  of	  the	  nearly	  2	  million	  council	  homes	  that	  have	  been	  lost	  to	  the	  Right	  to	  Buy	  since	  1980,	  over	  40	  per	  cent	  are	  now	  being	  rented	  out	  by	  private	  landlords.	  So	  a	  hypothesis	  of	  10	  out	  of	  the	  30	  leasehold	  properties	  being	  let	  is	  if	  anything	  on	  the	  low	  side,	  especially	  in	  London,	  where	  market	  rents,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  sold	  council	  homes,	  are	  so	  high.	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  As	  we’ve	  seen	   from	  the	  actual	  examples	  we’ve	   looked	  at,	   since	   the	  early	  2000s	  estate	  regeneration	  schemes	  in	  London	  increase	  the	  housing	  capacity	  on	  the	  new	  development	  by	   between	   two	   and	   three	   times,	   so	   let’s	   take	   an	   average	   increase	   of	   two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  times,	  and	  say	  that	  the	  new	  development	  will	  increase	  our	  hypothetical	  estate	  from	  100	  homes	  to	  250	  properties.	  
Now,	  what	  residents	  are	  promised	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  process	  is	  that	  all	  70	  existing	  secure	  tenancies	  on	  social	  rent	  levels	  will	  be	  rehoused	  on	  the	  new	  development	  on	  the	  same	   secure	   tenancies	   at	   the	   same	   social	   rent	   levels	   (indicated	   in	   red);	   while	   the	  leaseholders,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   are	   offered	   shared	   ownership	   deals	   on	   the	   new	  properties	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey).	  The	  councils	  and	  housing	  associations	  call	  this	  ‘like-­‐for-­‐like’	   replacement,	   to	  which	   residents	   are	   guaranteed	   first	   choice	  by	   their	  Right	   to	  Return;	  and	  we’ll	  be	  looking	  at	  what	  both	  these	  terms	  actually	  mean	  in	  practice.	  
To	  convince	  the	  residents	  that	  the	  inconvenience	  of	   losing	  their	  demolished	  home	  –	  of	  being	  decanted	  to	  another	  temporary	  home	  and	  then	  back	  onto	  the	  new	  development,	  or	   of	   living	   on	   a	   construction	   site	   for	   an	   undisclosed	   number	   of	   years	  while	   the	   new	  dwellings	  are	  built	  –	  is	  for	  the	  greater	  good	  as	  well	  as	  their	  own	  benefit,	  the	  council	  or	  housing	   association	   also	   tells	   them	   that	  –	  in	   addition	   to	   resupplying	   their	   demolished	  homes	  on	  a	  like-­‐for-­‐like	  basis	  –	  the	  new	  development	  will	  contain	  an	  additional	  50	  new	  homes	   for	   London	   Living	   Rent	   (indicated	   in	   yellow),	   specifically	   targeted	   at	   young	  couples	  trying	  to	  get	  onto	  London’s	  property	  ladder.	  We’ll	  have	  a	  look	  in	  a	  minute	  at	  the	  conditions	  of	  this	  new	  tenure	  type	  of	  affordable	  housing.	  	  Finally,	   residents	  are	   told	   that	   in	  order	   to	  pay	   for	  all	   this	  new	  affordable	  housing	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  cross-­‐subsidise	  it	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  properties	  for	  market	  rent	  and	  sale.	   In	  our	  hypothetical	   case	   that	  means	  an	  extra	  100	  properties,	  which	  at	   this	   stage	  would	   typically	   be	   divided	   into	   50	   for	   market	   rent	   (indicated	   in	   purple)	   and	   50	   for	  market	  sale	  (indicated	  in	  black).	  That’s	  about	  where	  things	  stand	  for	  the	  next	  few	  years	  of	   disbelief,	   denial,	   angry	   resistance,	   protracted	   negotiations	   and	   final,	   exhausted	  acquiescence.	  	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  demolition,	  however,	  several	  long	  years	  after	  the	  regeneration	  was	  initiated,	   things	  have	   changed	  on	   the	   estate.	  The	  70	  households	  on	   secure	   social	   rent	  tenures	   have	   been	   reduced	   to	   50	   (indicated	   in	   red).	   Many	   of	   these	   tenants,	   ground	  down	  by	  the	  stress	  of	  endless	  consultations	  and	  council	  meetings	  in	  which	  their	  voices	  are	   repeatedly	   ignored,	   the	   insecurity	   of	   not	   knowing	   what	   their	   future	   will	   be,	   or	  simply	   not	  wanting	   to	   live	   on	   a	   construction	   site	   for	   the	   next	   10-­‐20	   years,	   will	   have	  taken	  the	  council’s	  offer	  of	  rehousing	  elsewhere,	  either	  within	  the	  borough	  or	  outside	  of	  it,	  often	  losing	  their	  secure	  tenancy	  as	  a	  result	  and	  having	  their	  rents	  increased.	  Indeed,	  councils	  actively	  encourage	  tenants	  to	  move	  off	  the	  estate	  long	  before	  demolition	  starts,	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and	   even	  –	  as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Ebury	   Bridge	   estate	   regeneration	  –	  before	   planning	  permission	   for	   the	   new	   development	   has	   been	   granted.	   Of	   the	   1,034	   secure	   council	  tenants	   on	   the	  Heygate	   estate,	   only	   45	   had	   returned	   to	   the	   new	   development	   by	  February	  2013;	  216	  were	  rehoused	  within	  the	  SE17	  postcode,	  while	  the	  remaining	  773	  council	  tenants	  were	  scattered	  across	  the	  borough	  and	  beyond,	  with	  some	  relocated	  as	  far	  as	  Greenwich.	  	  
 	  For	   the	   same	   reasons,	   the	  30	   leaseholders	   on	  our	  hypothetical	   estate	   have	  now	  been	  reduced	  to	  15.	  The	  other	  15	  have	  accepted	  the	  council’s	  offer	  of	  compensation,	  typically	  under	  the	  threat	  that	  the	  offer	  was	  a	  one-­‐off	  and	  would	  not	  be	  renewed,	  and	  purchased	  a	   place	   elsewhere.	   However,	   given	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   that	   compensation,	   this	   means	  properties	   either	   on	   the	   outskirts	   of	   London	   at	   best,	   and	   often	   out	   of	   the	   capital	  altogether.	   Again,	   on	   the	  Heygate	   estate	   scheme,	   leaseholders	   ended	   up	   in	   the	   Outer	  London	  boroughs	  of	  Barnet,	  Enfield,	  Waltham	  Forest,	  Redbridge,	  Havering,	  Bromley	  and	  Croydon,	   with	   the	   majority	   relocating	   to	   Bexley.	   Others	   ended	   up	   outside	   London	  altogether,	   in	   Berkshire,	   Hertfordshire,	   Essex	   and	   Kent.	   While	   leaseholders	   on	   the	  Aylesbury	   estate	   regeneration	   scheme	   have	   ended	   up	   as	   far	   away	   as	   Leicester,	  Warwickshire,	  Wiltshire	  and	  Wales.	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  Importantly,	   for	  our	  hypothetical	  scheme,	   in	  place	  of	   the	  vacated	  20	  council	   tenancies	  and	  15	  leasehold	  homes	  –	  some	  of	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  housed	  private	  renters	  –	  the	  empty	  homes	  have	  now	  been	  used	  to	  house	  35	  tenants	  on	  either	  short-­‐term	  tenancies	  or	   as	   property	   guardianships	   (indicated	   in	   blue	   tissue	   paper).	   This	   serves	   four	  purposes.	  	  First,	   such	   tenancies	  have	  no	   rights	  of	   tenure,	   so	   the	   tenants	   can	  be	  given	  one	  month	  and	  two-­‐weeks’	  notice	  respectively,	  and	  the	  council	  has	  no	  obligation	  or	  responsibility	  for	   rehousing	   them.	   Indeed,	   since	   the	   changes	   to	   legislation	   in	   the	  2010	  Localism	  Act,	  councils	   can	   offer	   even	   secure	   council	   tenants	   private	   rental	   housing	   in	   lieu	   of	   their	  demolished	  homes.	  Should	  the	  council	  tenant	  refuse	  to	  take	  up	  this	  offer	  of	  rehousing,	  whether	  it	  is	  located	  in	  London	  or	  Newcastle,	  the	  council’s	  duty	  of	  care	  to	  them	  is	  now	  discharged,	  since	  the	  tenants	  is	  legally	  deemed	  to	  have	  made	  themselves	  ‘intentionally	  homeless’.	  It	   is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  unpleasant	  aspects	  of	  this	  threat	  that,	  having	  judged	  a	  former	  council	  tenant	  to	  have	  made	  themselves	  intentionally	  homeless,	  the	  council	  can	  now	  call	  in	  Children	  and	  Young	  People	  Services	  to	  take	  children	  away	  from	  a	  homeless	  single	  mother.	  Newham	  council,	  for	  example,	  which	  in	  the	  five	  years	  between	  2012	  and	  2017	  rehoused	  over	  3000	  Newham	  residents	  outside	  of	  the	  borough,	  continues	  to	  use	  this	   threat	   against	   single	   mothers	   who	   have	   refused	   relocation	   to	   Birmingham,	  Manchester	  or	  Bradford.	  	  Second,	  the	  temporary	  placement	  of	  people	  on	  the	  council’s	  housing	  waiting	  list	  in	  the	  council	   estate’s	   empty	   homes	   stops	   squatters	   from	   occupying	   them.	   From	   the	  
©Architects	  for	  Social	  Housing	  2018	  18	  
Carpenters	   estate	   in	   Newham	   to	   the	   Sweets	   Way	   estate	   in	   Barnet,	   the	  Marian	   Court	  estate	  in	  Hackney,	  the	  Loughborough	  Park	  estate	  in	  Brixton	  and	  the	  Aylesbury	  estate	  in	  Camberwell,	   such	   occupations	   have	   acted	   as	   a	   focus	   for	   organisation	   against	   the	  impending	  demolition	  of	  the	  estate,	  and	  councils	  have	  learned	  not	  to	  take	  this	  risk.	  	  Third,	   as	   happened	   on	   the	   Carpenters	   estate	   in	   Newham,	   the	   incomers	   are	   usually	  selected	  from	  outside	  the	  area,	  with	  no	  local	  connections	  to	  the	  existing	  residents,	  and	  are	   often	   selected	   by	   the	   council	   to	   include	   people	   with	   a	   history	   of	   criminal,	   drug-­‐related	  or	  anti-­‐social	  behaviour.	  Their	  relocation	  onto	  the	  estate	  not	  only	  damages	  the	  reputation	   of	   the	   community	   within	   the	   neighbourhood,	   making	   it	   conform	   to	   the	  stereotypes	   about	   estates	   the	   council	   uses	   to	   justify	   its	   demolition,	   but	   further	  encourages	   long-­‐standing	   residents	   to	   sell	   up	   and	   move	   away	   or	   accept	   rehousing	  elsewhere	  by	  the	  council.	  	  And	   fourth,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	   households	   on	   secure	  tenancies	  at	  the	  time	  of	  demolition	  means	  those	  households	  don’t	  have	  to	  be	  rehoused	  on	  the	  new	  development.	  This	  reduces	  the	  number	  of	  replacement	  homes	  for	  social	  or	  affordable	   rents	   that	   have	   to	   be	   included	   on	   the	   new	   development,	   and	   therefore	  increases	   the	  number	  of	  properties	   that	   can	  be	  built	   for	   shared	  ownership	  or	  market	  sale.	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  redevelopment,	  therefore,	  things	  have	  turned	  out	  far	  worse	  than	  the	  residents	   could	   have	   imagined	   when	   they	   were	   told	   that	   their	   estate	   was	   up	   for	  ‘regeneration’.	  
The	   70	   like-­‐for-­‐like	   replacement	   homes	   secure	   tenants	   were	   promised	   have	   been	  reduced	  to	  a	  mere	  25	  homes,	  and	  those	  are	  not	  for	  social	  rent	  but	  for	  London	  Affordable	  Rent	   (indicated	   in	   orange).	   At	   best,	   these	   will	   house	   25	   of	   the	   remaining	   50	   tenant	  households	  with	  secure	  tenancies.	  But	  these	  will	  lose	  that	  security	  and	  have	  to	  come	  up	  with	   the	   increased	   rental	   and	   service	   charges	   if	   they	   want	   to	   enact	   what	   they	   were	  promised	  was	  their	  Right	  to	  Return	  to	  the	  new	  development.	  
But	   what	   of	   the	   other	   25	   council	   tenants?	   Well,	   under	   the	   deliberately	   deceptive	  category	   of	   ‘affordable	   housing’,	   the	   remaining	   25	   homes	   the	   council	   is	   obliged	   to	  provide	  for	  secure	  tenants	  have	  now	  materialised	  as	  London	  Living	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  yellow).	  As	  we	  saw,	  this	  is	  set	  at	  one-­‐third	  the	  median	  income	  of	  the	  borough,	  which	  in	  Lambeth	  in	  2017	  was	  more	  than	  one-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   times	  social	  rent.	  Worse	  still,	   this	   is	  a	  Rent	  to	  Buy	  product,	  and	  tenants	  who	  enter	  into	  the	  deal	  are	  contractually	  required	  not	  only	   to	   find	   the	   extra	   50	   per	   cent	   rent	   and	   service	   charges,	   but	   also	   to	   put	   aside	  sufficient	   funds	   to	  buy	   the	  property	  within	  10	  years.	   If	   they	  don’t,	   they	  will	   lose	   their	  tenancy.	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This	   is	  what	   the	  Government	  calls	   ‘incentivising’	  people	  out	  of	  rental	  dependency	  and	  into	   home	   ownership,	   and	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   housing	   policies	   not	   only	   of	   the	  Conservative	  Party,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party	  and	  Liberal	  Democrat	  Party.	  What	  isn’t	  clear	   in	  any	  of	   their	  policies	   is	  where	   the	  money	  required	   to	  buy	  a	  £650,000	  home	   is	  meant	  to	  come	  from	  for	  a	  former	  council	  tenant	  used	  to	  paying	  social	  rent.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  shall	   see,	   these	   properties	   are	   only	   nominally	   for	   existing	   council	   tenants,	   who	   can’t	  hope	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  London	  Living	  Rent	  tenancy,	  and	  are	  in	  reality	  built	  for	  middle-­‐class	  households	  that	  can	  afford	  home	  ownership	  on	  these	  financial	  terms.	  
The	   bulk	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘affordable	   housing’	   provision	   on	   the	   new	   development,	  however,	   is	  made	  up	  of	  shared	  ownership	  properties	   (indicated	   in	  dark	  grey).	  On	  our	  hypothetical	   estate	   redevelopment	   these	   account	   for	   50	   of	   the	   250	  new	  properties,	   a	  fifth	  of	  the	  total	  dwellings,	  but	  half	  of	  the	  affordable	  housing	  provision.	  Only	  15	  of	  these,	  at	   best,	   will	   be	   taken	   up	   by	   the	   former	   leaseholders	   whose	   homes	   have	   been	  demolished,	  and	  who	  will	  now	  become	  assured	  tenants.	  The	  remaining	  35	  are	  for	  new	  residents	  looking	  to	  get	  on	  London’s	  property	  ladder,	  and	  willing	  to	  enter	  into	  what	  we	  have	   seen	   are	   the	   extraordinarily	   risky	   and	   exploitative	   conditions	   of	   a	   shared	  ownership	  deal.	  
Despite	  this,	  with	  the	  25	  London	  Affordable	  Rent	  homes	  (indicated	  in	  orange)	  and	  the	  25	   London	   Living	   Rent	   properties	   (indicated	   in	   yellow),	   the	   50	   shared	   ownership	  properties	   together	   make	   up	   40	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   total	   new	   builds.	   And	   in	   London,	  although	  it	  has	  been	  reached	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  70	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  and	  30	  leasehold	  homes,	   this	   percentage	   of	   affordable	   housing	   qualifies	   the	   new	   development	   for	   full	  public	   funding	   under	   the	   Greater	   London	   Authority’s	  Affordable	   Homes	   Programme	  2016-­‐2021.	  	  Finally,	   what	   of	   the	   other	   150	   properties,	   which	   make	   up	   60	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   new	  development?	  Well,	  25	  of	  these,	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total,	  are	  for	  market	  rent	  (indicated	  in	   purple),	   which	   means	   three-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   times	   social	   rent.	   But	   the	   remaining	   125	  properties,	   50	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   entire	   new	   development,	   and	   two-­‐and-­‐half-­‐times	   the	  number	   residents	   were	   originally	   promised,	   are	   now	   for	   private	   sale	   (indicated	   in	  black).	  
Bad	   as	   this	   is,	   however,	   the	   reality	   of	   our	   hypothetical	   estate	   regeneration	   is	   even	  worse.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  tenure	  of	  the	  new	  dwellings	  at	  the	  end	  of	  redevelopment	  and	  their	  actual	  use.	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  First	  of	  all,	  either	  because	  of	  their	  inability	  to	  afford	  the	  more	  than	  50	  per	  cent	  increase	  on	   their	   rent	   and	   service	   charges,	   or	   because	   of	   their	   complete	   inability	   to	   raise	   the	  money	  necessary	  to	  purchase	  the	  property,	  sooner	  or	   later	  5	  of	   the	  households	   in	   the	  London	  Living	  Rent	  properties	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  keep	  up	  the	  necessary	  payments.	  Under	  the	  Greater	  London	  Authority’s	  policy	  on	  London	  Living	  Rent,	   this	  means	   their	  homes	  now	  revert	  to	  shared	  ownership	  properties.	  
Of	  the	  affordable	  housing	  provision	  on	  the	  new	  development,	  therefore,	  there	  are	  now	  25	  homes	  for	  London	  Affordable	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  orange);	  20	  for	  London	  Living	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  yellow),	  a	  reduction	  of	  5;	  and	  55	  for	  shared	  ownership	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey),	  an	  increase	  of	  5.	  
The	  crucial	  change,	  however,	  between	  the	  tenure	  at	  which	  the	  new	  properties	  were	  sold	  and	   the	   tenure	   of	   their	   use	   is	   in	   the	   150	   properties	   for	  market	   rent	   and	   sale.	   This	   is	  because	  the	  buyers	  of	  the	  properties	  for	  private	  sale	  are	  not	  living	  in	  them.	  On	  the	  first	  redevelopment	   sites	  of	   the	  Woodberry	  Down	  and	  Elephant	  Park	   schemes,	   the	  bulk	  of	  the	  properties	  for	  market	  sale	  were	  marketed	  to	  and	  purchased	  by	  overseas	  investors.	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It’s	   hard	   to	   get	   precise	   figures	   on	   this,	   as	   it	   falls	   under	   commercially	   confidential	  information	  and	  councils	  won’t	  release	  the	  information,	  but	  on	  Woodberry	  Down	  55	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  properties	  built	  in	  phase	  1	  of	  the	  new	  development	  were	  bought	  by	  overseas	  investors,	  mainly	  from	  Asian	  markets;	  while	  on	  the	  Southgate	  Gardens	  development	  on	  the	  former	  Heygate,	  every	  one	  of	  51	  properties	  were	  sold	  to	  overseas	  investors	  before	  they	  were	  even	  marketed	  in	  the	  UK.	  But	  more	  generally	  we	  know	  that	  an	  extraordinary	  30	  per	   cent	  of	  properties	   sold	   in	  London	   in	  2017	  were	  bought	  by	  overseas	   investors,	  often	   as	   investments	   by	   off-­‐shore	   companies,	   and	   at	   the	   high	   end	   of	   the	  market	   that	  increased	   to	   over	   50	   per	   cent.	   Many	   of	   these	   are	   being	   built	   on	   land	   cleared	   of	  demolished	  council	  and	  housing	  association	  estates.	  	  What	  this	  means	  for	  our	  hypothetical	  estate	  redevelopment	  is	  that	  of	  the	  125	  properties	  for	  market	  sale,	  only	  25	  are	  now	  owner	  occupied	  (indicated	  in	  black),	  75	  are	  Buy	  to	  Let	  (indicated	   in	   purple),	   and	   the	   remaining	   25	   are	   Buy	   to	   Leave	   (indicated	   in	   white	  marble).	  This	  latter	  term	  means	  they	  have	  been	  purchased	  purely	  as	  an	  investment,	  and	  are	  not	  being	  used	  either	  by	  their	  owners	  or	  by	  anyone	  else	  as	  accommodation.	  But	  the	  75	  Buy	  to	  Let	  properties	  means	  the	  properties	  for	  market	  rent	  have	  now	  increased	  from	  25	  to	  100	  dwellings,	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  entire	  new	  development	  (indicated	  in	  purple).	  
Far	   from	   ushering	   Londoners	   into	   the	   entirely	   fictitious	   home-­‐owning	   democracy	   to	  which	   all	   three	   of	   our	   major	   political	   parties	   have	   signed	   up	   in	   their	   housing	  manifestoes,	  estate	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  is	  returning	  us	  to	  a	  rentier	  society	  of	  exploitative	   landlords	   and	   increasingly	  powerless	   tenants	  who	  are	   forced	   to	  pay	  ever	  higher	   proportions	   of	   their	   income	   for	   accommodation.	   The	   estate	   regeneration	  programme	  is	  returning	  us	  to	  precisely	  that	  slum	  existence	  of	  the	  1930s	  from	  which	  the	  great	  council	  housing	  programme	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  years	  was	  initiated	  to	  save	  us.	  	  Home	  ownership	   in	   the	  UK,	  which	  peaked	  at	  71	  per	   cent	   in	  2003,	  has	  been	  declining	  ever	  since	  and	  now	  stands	  at	  63	  per	  cent.	   In	  London	   the	   figures	  are	  even	   lower,	  with	  only	  47	  per	  cent	  having	  a	  mortgage	  or	  owning	  their	  own	  home.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  rents	  on	  the	  private	  market,	  which	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  British	  households	  now	  live	  in,	  increasing	  to	  30	  per	   cent	  of	  households	   in	  London,	   rose	   to	   an	  average	  of	   £1,615	  per	  month	   in	   July	  2018,	   more	   than	   twice	   the	   national	   average.	  The	   total	   rent	   paid	   by	   UK	   tenants	   in	  2017	  rose	   to	   £51.6	   billion,	   more	   than	   double	   the	   £22.6	   billion	   paid	   in	   2007,	   just	   10	  years	  before.	  The	  fact	  123	  of	  our	  650	  Members	  of	  Parliament	  are	  themselves	  landlords	  –	   20	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   total	   across	   all	   parties	   –	   and	   so	   many	   of	   our	   councillors	   are	  professionally	   involved	   in	   the	   building	   industry	   cannot	   be	   discounted	   as	   a	   financial	  motivation	  in	  this	  disastrous	  programme.	  	  But	   returning	   from	   the	   general	   to	   the	   particular,	   what	   does	   this	   programme	   of	  demolition	   and	   redevelopment	   mean	   socially	   for	   our	   hypothetical	   estate	   of	   100	  households?	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Let’s	   recall	   that,	   before	   the	   regeneration	   process	   began,	   the	   estate	   was	   home	   to	   70	  households	  of	  council	  tenants	  (indicated	  in	  red),	  20	  households	  of	  resident	  leaseholders	  (indicated	   in	   light	   grey)	   and	   10	   households	   of	   market	   renters	   from	   non-­‐resident	  leaseholders	  (indicated	  in	  purple).	  
Of	   this	   estate	   community,	   a	   total	   of	   70	  households	  have	  now	  been	   evicted	   from	   their	  homes	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  regeneration	  of	  their	  estate,	  never	  to	  return.	  45	  of	  these	  households	  were	   council	   tenants	   (indicated	   in	   red),	  who	  will	   be	   rehoused	   elsewhere,	  either	  within	  the	  borough,	  outside	  the	  borough,	  or	  out	  of	  London	  altogether.	  We	  should	  remember	  that	  this	  rehousing	  will	  take	  up	  existing	  council	  homes	  that	  could	  have	  been	  used	   to	  house	  homeless	   families	   living	   in	   temporary	  accommodation	  or	   to	   reduce	   the	  council’s	  housing	  waiting	  list.	  15	  of	  the	  evicted	  households	  were	  leaseholders	  (indicated	  in	   light	  grey),	  who	  will	  have	   taken	   the	  compensation	   for	   their	  demolished	  homes	  and	  bought	  or	  rented	  elsewhere,	  typically	  in	  Outer	  London	  or	  outside	  of	  London	  altogether.	  Finally,	  10	  of	  these	  evicted	  households	  were	  private	  renters	  (indicated	  in	  purple)	  who	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will	  have	  moved	  on	  to	  what	  we	  have	  seen	  is	  an	  increasingly	  unaffordable	  private	  rental	  market.	  Some	  of	  these,	  unable	  to	  afford	  this	  market,	  will	  have	  become	  homeless.	  
Of	   the	   100	   households	   that	   were	   promised	   the	   Right	   to	   Return,	   25	   former	   council	  tenants	   out	   of	   the	   original	   70	   are	   now	   housing	   association	   tenants	   living	   in	   London	  Affordable	   Rent	   tenancies	   (indicated	   in	   orange).	   As	   I	  mentioned	   before,	   this	   is	   either	  because	   responsibility	   for	   the	   affordable	   housing	   provision	   in	   new	   developments	   is	  handed	   over	   to	   a	   housing	   association,	   or	   because	   councils	   undertaking	   that	  redevelopment	  often	  do	   so	   through	  a	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicle	   that,	   for	  all	   intents	  and	  purposes,	   runs	   the	   new	   development	   as	   a	   housing	   association.	   Either	   way,	   returned	  council	  tenants	  are	  subject	  to	  increased	  rental	  and	  service	  charges	  and	  the	  reduction	  in	  tenancy	  rights	  consequent	  upon	  becoming	  a	  housing	  association	  tenant.	  
Of	  the	  original	  30	  leaseholders	  on	  the	  now	  demolished	  estate,	  only	  5	  have	  returned,	  and	  these	  are	  now	  assured	  tenants	  on	  shared	  ownership	  deals	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey),	  with	  the	  hugely	  increased	  mortgage	  repayments	  and	  almost	  non-­‐existent	  rights	  of	  ownership	  that	  entails.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  Right	  to	  Return	  means	  for	  existing	  residents	  whose	  estate	  is	  ‘regenerated’.	  
But	   what	   of	   the	   new	   residents,	   for	   whom	   the	   regeneration	   programme	   –	   we	   are	  constantly	   told	   –	   has	   been	   developed	   as	   the	   only	   means	   of	   addressing	   our	   so-­‐called	  ‘housing	  crisis’?	  Well,	  20	  of	  these	  households	  have	  sufficient	  income	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  London	  Living	  Rent	  tenancy	  (indicated	  in	  yellow)	  while	  saving	  sufficient	  funds	  to	  get	  a	  mortgage	  on	  the	  property	  within	  10	  years.	  To	  get	  an	  idea	  of	  what	  this	  requires,	  Rent	  to	  Buy	  deals	  are	   available	   to	   households	   earning	   up	   to	   £60,000	   per	   year.	   We	   might	   ask	   why	  households	   with	   such	   incomes	   are	   being	   subsidised	   with	   government	   loans	   when	  council	   tenants	  are	   told	  by	   councils	  not	  only	   that	   their	  homes	   for	   social	   rent	  must	  be	  demolished	   to	  make	  way	   for	   such	   private	   property	   deals	   but	   that	   the	   same	   councils	  apparently	  can’t	  afford	  to	  build	  any	  new	  homes	  for	  social	  rent.	  
50	  of	  the	  new	  resident	  households	  have	  entered	  into	  shared	  ownership	  deals	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey).	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	   this	  means	   finding	  a	  25	  per	   cent	   share	  on	  properties	  averaging	  around	  £650,000	   in	   Inner	  London	  –	   so	   at	   least	   £162,500	  –	  plus	  £1,100	  per	  month	   rent.	   To	   give	   you	   an	   idea	   of	  what	   this	   requires	   in	   terms	  of	   household	   income,	  buying	   a	  £450,000	   home	   requires	   a	   21.5	   per	   cent	   deposit	   of	   £97,000	   and	   a	   salary	   of	  £77,000	   per	   year.	  We	   shouldn’t	   forget	   that,	   under	   the	   policy	   of	   the	   Conservative-­‐run	  government	   and	   the	  Labour-­‐run	  Greater	  London	  Authority,	   all	   three	  of	   these	   tenancy	  types	  are	  categorised	  as	  ‘affordable	  housing’.	  
But	   that	   isn’t	   all.	   25	   of	   the	   new	   resident	   households	   are	   homeowners	   (indicated	   in	  black)	  who	  can	  afford	  these	  prices.	  These	  are	   largely	  made	  up	  of	  wealthy	   investors	   in	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second-­‐homes,	   purchasers	   of	   properties	   occupied	   sometimes	   for	   only	   a	   few	  weeks	   a	  year,	  people	  commuting	  to	  work	  in	  London	  and	  after	  a	  pied-­‐a-­‐terre	  for	  the	  week,	  or	  the	  children	  of	  wealthy	  parents,	  often	  from	  overseas,	  studying	  in	  the	  capital.	  
25	   of	   the	   market	   sale	   properties	   are	   long-­‐term	   empty	   (indicated	   in	   white	   marble),	  purchased	  as	  a	  commodity	  for	  capital	  investment	  and	  property	  speculation	  on	  London’s	  housing	  market	  by	  non-­‐domicile	  owners.	  	  
But	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  new	  residents,	  100	  out	  of	  the	  195	  new	  households,	  and	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  250	  households	  in	  total,	  are	  the	  renters	  of	  the	  25	  market	  rent	  dwellings	  and	  75	  buy-­‐to-­‐rent	  properties	  (indicated	  in	  purple).	  
I	  want	  to	  emphasise	  that	  these	  figures	  are	  as	  good	  as	  it	  gets.	  The	  proportion	  of	  residents	  socially	   cleansed	   from	   their	   homes	   in	   our	   hypothetical	   example	   is	   far	   lower	   than	   the	  actual,	  ongoing	  regeneration	  schemes	  we	  started	  this	  report	  by	  looking	  at,	  such	  as	  the	  Ferrier	   estate,	   the	   Heygate	   estate,	   the	   Woodberry	   Down	   estate	   and	   the	   Aylesbury	  estate.	  The	  figures	  and	  proportions	  I’m	  using	  for	  our	  hypothetical	  example	  are	  based	  on	  the	   best	   deals	   for	   tenants,	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	   compensation	   for	   leaseholders,	   the	  greatest	  number	  of	  replacement	  homes	  for	  London	  Affordable	  Rent.	  Most	  regeneration	  schemes	  that	  demolish	  and	  redevelop	  the	  estates	  will	  be	  far	  worse	  than	  this.	  However,	  I’m	  happy	  to	  use	  this	  hypothetical	  best-­‐case	  scenario	  to	  demonstrate	  ASH’s	  argument,	  since,	   as	   we	   will	   see,	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   costs	   of	   estate	   demolition	   and	  redevelopment	   –	  social,	   financial	   and	  environmental	   –	   and	   the	   costs	  of	   refurbishment	  and	   infill	   is	   so	   great	   as	   to	  make	   the	   former,	   even	   in	   the	  best-­‐case	   scenario,	   the	  worst	  possible	  choice	  for	  everyone	  but	  the	  developers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
©Architects	  for	  Social	  Housing	  2018	   25	  
	  	  	  	  The	  difference	  between	  what	  residents	  are	  promised	  when	  they	  are	  first	  informed	  that	  their	   estate	   is	   being	   considered	   for	   regeneration	   and	   the	   reality	   of	   what	   that	  regeneration	   will	   result	   in	   has	   implications	   for	   the	   recent	  Greater	   London	   Authority	  policy	  on	  balloting	  residents.	  	  On	   the	   face	   of	   it	   this	   sounds	   like	   a	   positive	   move,	   but	   as	   with	   all	   things	   in	   estate	  regeneration	  the	  devil	  is	  in	  the	  detail.	  Architects	  for	  Social	  Housing	  has	  written	  in	  detail	  about	   the	   numerous	   failings	   in	   the	   GLA	   policy	   on	   resident	   ballots,	  which	   can	   be	   read	  about	  on	   the	  ASH	  blog;	  but	   the	  key	  ones	  are	   that	   the	  London	  Mayor,	   Sadiq	  Khan,	  has	  specified	  that	  only	  a	  single	  ballot	  will	  be	  permitted,	  and	  that	  the	  ballot	  must	  be	  held	  as	  early	   as	   possible	   in	   the	   regeneration	   process,	   and	   specifically	   before	   even	   a	   private	  development	  partner	  is	  allocated.	  	  Now,	  where	  an	  estate	  regeneration	  scheme	  means	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment,	   the	  funding	  of	  the	  entire	  scheme	  is	  dependent	  upon	  private	  development	  partners,	  whose	  financial	  investment	  in	  the	  scheme	  will	  determine	  the	  outcome	  of	  that	  scheme.	  Holding	  a	  ballot	  before	  private	  development	  partners	  have	  been	   found,	   therefore,	   is	  nonsense,	  since	  neither	   the	   council	  nor	   their	  as-­‐yet-­‐identified	  private	  development	  partners	   can	  possibly	  be	  expected	  to	  honour	  a	  proposal	  on	  which	  a	  viability	  assessment	  has	  not	  been	  produced.	  The	  residents,	  in	  effect,	  will	  be	  voting	  on	  nothing	  more	  than	  empty	  promises.	  
Holding	  the	  ballot	  so	  early	  in	  the	  process,	  therefore,	  can	  only	  be	  a	  means	  through	  which	  to	  manufacture	  resident	  consent	  to	  an	  agreement	  that	  the	  council,	  housing	  association	  and	   their	   private	   development	   partners	   and	   financial	   investors	   are	   free	   to	   change	  beyond	   recognition.	   That	   Sadiq	   Khan	   has	   insisted	   that	   the	   ballot	   vote	   be	   final	   and	  unrepeatable	  is	  the	  clearest	  indication	  that	  its	  purpose	  is	  not	  to	  empower	  residents	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  over	  the	  future	  of	  their	  homes,	  but	  to	  create	  a	  binding	  agreement	  they	  will	   have	   no	   further	   recourse	   to	   change,	   and	   to	   which	   the	   council	   and	   other	   private	  development	  partners,	  consultants	  and	  contractors	  can	  point	  in	  the	  face	  of	  criticism	  or	  objection,	  claiming	  the	  new	  development	  to	  be	  ‘resident-­‐led’.	  
To	  give	  you	  an	  example	  of	  how	  this	  will	  work,	  let’s	  move	  from	  our	  hypothetical	  estate	  regeneration	  scheme	  to	  an	  actual	  one.	  This	  is	  Knight’s	  Walk,	  the	  low-­‐rise	  component	  of	  Cotton	   Gardens	   estate	   in	   Kennington.	   Composed	   of	   bungalows	   and	   low–rise	   blocks	  designed	   for	   elderly	   residents	   and	   those	   living	   with	   disabilities,	   it	   was	   nonetheless	  deemed	   insufficiently	   dense	   by	   Lambeth	   council,	   who	   placed	   the	   estate	   on	   its	  regeneration	  programme	  in	  December	  2014.	  Knight’s	  Walk	  has	  a	  total	  of	  33	  homes,	  of	  which	   26	   are	   for	   social	   rent	   (indicated	   in	   red)	   and	   7	   are	   freehold	   (indicated	   in	   light	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grey).	  Freeholders	  not	  only	  own	   the	  property	  outright	  but	  –	  unlike	   leaseholders,	  who	  lease	  it	  from	  the	  landlord	  –	  also	  own	  the	  land	  it	  stands	  on,	  making	  it	  far	  more	  expensive	  for	   the	   council	   to	  buy	   them	  out	   through	  Compulsory	  Purchase	  Orders.	  This	  would	  be	  crucial	  to	  saving	  their	  homes	  from	  the	  bulldozers.	  Initially	   the	   council’s	  proposal	  was	   to	  demolish	   the	  whole	  of	  Knight’s	  Walk.	  However,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Architects	  for	  Social	  Housing,	  residents	  were	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  compensation	  for	  the	  freeholders,	  who	  were	  united	  in	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  full	  demolition	  scheme	  and	  threatened	  to	  resist	  the	  CPOs	  in	  court,	  was	  so	  great	  that	  the	  council	  eventually	  changed	  their	  plans	  to	  a	  partial	  demolition	  scheme.	  This	  was	  agreed	  to	   by	   the	   residents	   and	   proposed	   to	   Lambeth	   Cabinet	   in	   November	   2015	   on	   the	  following	  proposal.	  	  Of	  the	  26	  homes	  for	  social	  rent,	  17	  would	  be	  demolished,	  plus	  1	  of	  the	  7	  freehold	  homes.	  In	  their	  place	  the	  council	  would	  build	  42	  new	  homes	  for	  social	  rent,	  which,	  with	  the	  9	  existing	   ones,	   made	   51	   homes	   for	   social	   rent	   (indicated	   in	   red).	   The	   1	   demolished	  freehold	   home	  would	   be	   replaced,	  making	   up	   7	   freehold	   homes	   in	   total	   (indicated	   in	  light	  grey).	  And	  to	  reduce	  the	  council’s	  housing	  waiting	  list	  –	  which	  Lambeth	  council	  has	  always	  argued	  is	  the	  motivation	  for	  their	  estate	  regeneration	  programme	  –	  they	  would	  also	  build	  an	  additional	  39	  dwellings	  for	  market	  rent	  (indicated	  in	  purple).	  
It’s	  not	  clear	  how	  2-­‐bedroom	  homes	  renting	  for	  £480	  per	  week	  was	  meant	  to	  reduce	  the	  housing	  waiting	  list,	  but	  the	  promised	  result	  was	  that	  an	  estate	  of	  33	  homes	  would	  be	  increased	  to	  97	  dwellings,	  nearly	  three	  times	  the	  capacity;	  all	  the	  existing	  homes	  would	  be	  replaced	  on	  a	  like-­‐for-­‐like	  basis	  with	  the	  same	  rental	  levels	  and	  tenancy	  rights;	  and	  there	  would	  be	  a	  net	  increase	  of	  25	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  and	  39	  homes	  for	  market	  rent.	  Although	  the	  existing	  residents	  weren’t	  formerly	  balloted	  on	  this	  proposal,	  this	  is	  what	  they	  agreed	   to,	   and	  what	  was	  presented	   to	  Lambeth	  Cabinet	   for	  approval.	  However	  –	  and	   this	   is	   why	   this	   example	   is	   so	   instructive	   to	   the	   progress	   of	   estate	   regeneration	  schemes	  and	  the	  subterfuge	  of	  balloting	  residents	  early	  in	  the	  process	  –	  all	  these	  figures	  were	   described	   in	   the	   proposal	   as	   ‘indicative’	   and	   subject	   to	   what	   the	   council	   called	  ‘further	  detailed	  analysis’.	  
The	  results	  of	  that	  analysis	  came	  two	  years	  later,	  in	  December	  2017,	  when	  the	  council	  sought	  planning	  permission	  for	  the	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  of	  Knight’s	  Walk	  to	  a	  scheme	  that	  bore	  almost	  no	  relation	  to	  what	  had	  been	  submitted	  to	  Cabinet.	  Although	  the	   number	   of	   homes	   the	   council	   proposed	   demolishing	   had	   stayed	   the	   same,	   the	  number	   of	   properties	   it	   sought	   planning	   permission	   to	   build	   had	   increased	   by	   2	   to	   a	  total	   of	   99	   dwellings,	   exactly	   three	   times	   the	   original	   housing	   capacity	   of	   the	   estate.	  However,	   there	  were	  now	  to	  be	  no	  additional	   social	   rent	  homes,	  and	   the	  9	  homes	   for	  social	  rent	  left	  (indicated	  in	  red),	  after	  the	  demolition	  of	  the	  other	  17,	  will	  be	  all	  there	  are	  on	  the	  new	  development.	  Significantly,	  of	  the	  17	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  promised	  to	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rehouse	   the	  council	   tenants	  whose	  homes	  will	  be	  demolished,	   there	  are	  now	  only	  14,	  and	  these	  will	  be	  for	  London	  Affordable	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  orange).	  
We	   might	   ask	   where	   the	   other	   three	   households	   of	   council	   tenants	   have	   gone.	   The	  answer	   is	   that	   they	  have	  accepted	   rehousing	  elsewhere,	   either	   in	  Lambeth	  or	  outside	  the	   borough,	   possibly	   in	   council	   housing,	   possibly	   in	   private	   rental	   accommodation,	  possibly	  in	  temporary	  accommodation.	  But	  if	  the	  17	  replacement	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  have	  been	   turned	   into	  14	  dwellings	   for	  London	  Affordable	  Rent,	  what	  of	   the	  other	  28	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  the	  residents	  were	  promised?	  
Well,	  13	  of	   these	  have	  been	  turned	   into	  homes	   for	  Tenancy	  Rent	  (indicated	   in	  green).	  This,	  remember,	  is	  for	  new	  council	  tenancies	  in	  affordable	  rent	  properties,	  and	  at	  £265	  per	  week	   for	   a	   2-­‐bedroom	  property	   is	   nearly	   double	   social	   rent.	  While	   12	  have	   been	  turned	  into	  Intermediate	  or	  Affordable	  Rent	  dwellings	  (indicated	  in	  blue),	  which	  set	  at	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  market	  rate	  will	  cost	  £384	  per	  week	  to	  rent	  for	  a	  2-­‐bedroom	  home,	  nearly	  three	  times	  social	  rent.	  
Together,	  the	  9	  existing	  homes	  for	  social	  rent,	  the	  14	  homes	  for	  London	  Affordable	  Rent,	  the	   13	   homes	   for	   Tenancy	   Strategy	   Rent	   and	   the	   12	   homes	   for	   Intermediate	   rent,	  despite	   being	   3	   less	   than	   the	   51	   homes	   for	   social	   rent	   residents	   were	   originally	  promised,	  make	  up	  48	  of	  the	  99	  total	  dwellings	  in	  the	  proposed	  new	  development,	  and	  therefore	   slightly	   below	   50	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   total.	   This,	   therefore,	   qualifies	   the	  regeneration	   scheme	   for	   public	   funding	   from	   the	   Greater	   London	   Authority,	   which	  Lambeth	  council	  in	  fact	  received	  in	  September	  2017.	  
Again,	  indicatively,	  the	  1	  replacement	  freehold	  home	  has	  now	  been	  quietly	  dropped,	  the	  freeholder	   having	   understandably	   taken	   the	   compensation	   from	   the	   council	   for	   their	  demolished	  home	  and	  purchased	  what	  new	  home	  they	  could	  afford,	  presumably	  outside	  of	  Inner	  London.	  This	  leaves	  just	  6	  freehold	  properties	  (indicated	  in	  light	  grey).	  
But	   as	   bad,	   perhaps,	   as	   this	   loss	   of	   the	   42	   new	   homes	   for	   social	   rent	   promised	   to	  residents,	  is	  that	  the	  promised	  39	  dwellings	  for	  market	  rent	  have	  now	  been	  turned	  into	  45	  properties	  for	  market	  sale	  (indicated	  in	  black),	  45	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total.	  On	  2017-­‐18	  sale	   values	   the	   council	   has	   estimated	   these	   at	   £520,000	   for	   a	   1-­‐bedroom	   property,	  £650,000	  for	  a	  2-­‐bedroom	  property,	  and	  £735,000	  for	  a	  3-­‐bedroom	  property.	  In	  fact,	  by	  the	   time	   the	   redevelopment	   is	   completed	   in	   5	   years’	   time	   these	   prices	   will	   be	  considerably	  higher.	  So	  much	  for	  the	  households	  on	  Lambeth	  council’s	  housing	  waiting	  list.	  
And	  yet,	  it	  is	  on	  the	  proposal	  put	  to	  Cabinet	  in	  November	  2015	  that	  residents,	  under	  the	  Greater	  London	  Authority	  policy,	  will	  be	  balloted,	   for	   the	   first	   and	   final	   time,	  with	  no	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Part	  Three:	  The	  Financial	  Costs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  So,	   why	   is	   this	   the	   case?	   To	   answer	   this	   question,	   we	   have	   to	   look	   at	   what	   the	   UK	  government	  is	  and	  isn’t	  funding.	  This	  in	  turn	  will	  tell	  us	  what	  it	  wants	  councils	  to	  build	  on	  the	  land	  cleared	  of	  demolished	  council	  estates	  under	  the	  cloak	  of	  ‘regeneration’?	  	  
This	  next	   slide	  shows	   the	   latest	   round	  of	  funding	  guidance	  to	  come	  out	  of	   the	  Greater	  London	  Authority,	  which	  has	  been	  given	  £4.8	  billion	  of	  government	  funding	  to	  build	  at	  least	  116,000	  affordable	  homes	  by	  March	  2022.	  
• Homes	  for	  social	  rent	  (indicated	  in	  red)	  and	  
• Homes	   for	   London	  Affordable	  Rent	   (indicated	   in	   orange)	  will	   be	   subsidised	   to	  the	  sum	  of	  £100,000	  per	  new-­‐build	  dwelling.	  
• All	   the	   other	   forms	   of	   affordable	   housing,	   including	   London	   Living	   Rent	  (indicated	  in	  yellow),	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• Tenancy	  Strategy	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  green),	  
• Intermediate	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  blue)	  and	  
• Shared	   Ownership	   (indicated	   in	   dark	   grey),	   will	   receive	   £38,000	   for	   every	  dwelling	  started	  between	  2018-­‐19	  and	  2019-­‐20,	  and	  £28,000	  if	  started	  between	  2020-­‐21	  and	  2021-­‐22.	  It’s	  notable	  that	  the	  subsidies	  for	  social	  rent	  and	  London	  Affordable	  Rent	  are	  exactly	  the	  same,	   so	   the	   only	   justification	   for	   councils	   replacing	   the	   former	   with	   the	   latter	   is	  because	   of	   what,	   for	   them,	   is	   the	   relatively	   tiny	   amount	   of	   profit	   they	   make	   at	   the	  relatively	  greater	  expense	  of	  their	  tenants.	  These,	  however,	  aren’t	  the	  only	  government	  subsidies.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  subsidies	  to	  build	  affordable	  housing	  provision,	  there	  also	  exist	  subsidies	  for	  purchasing	  such	  properties.	  
London	  Living	  Rent,	  set	  at	  a	  third	  of	  median	  income	  and	  requiring	  the	  householder	  to	  take	  out	  a	  mortgage	  on	  the	  property	  within	  10	  years,	  is	  subsidised	  for	  the	  first	  five	  years	  under	   the	   government’s	   Rent	   to	   Buy	   scheme.	   This	   subsidy,	   remember,	   is	   available	   to	  households	  earning	  up	  to	  £60,000	  per	  year.	  
Shared	   Ownership	   is	   an	   even	   greater	   subsidy	   of	   middle-­‐income	   earners,	   with	   the	  government’s	  Help	  to	  Buy	  scheme	  being	  available	  to	  households	  earning	  up	  to	  £90,000	  per	  year.	  In	  London	  this	  equates	  to	  a	  5-­‐year	  interest-­‐free	  government	  equity	  loan	  for	  up	  to	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  price	  of	  a	  property	  worth	  up	  to	  £600,000,	  and	  requires	  a	  mortgage	  from	   a	   commercial	   lender	   of	   at	   least	   25	   per	   cent	   and	   a	   deposit	   of	   5	   per	   cent.	   Quite	  extraordinarily	   for	   a	   government	   that	   claims	   council	   estates	   are	   unsustainably	  subsidised	  by	  the	  state,	  for	  the	  5	  years	  between	  2016	  and	  2021	  the	  same	  government,	  through	   its	   Shared	   Ownership	   and	   Affordable	   Homes	   Programme,	   has	   allocated	   £4.1	  billion	  in	  funds	  for	  Help	  to	  Buy.	  In	  contrast,	  only	  £1.67	  billion	  was	  belatedly	  allocated	  in	  June	  of	  this	  year	  to	  build	  homes	  for	  social	  rent.	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  Against	   these	  subsidies,	   let’s	   look	  at	  what	   it	   costs	   to	  build	  new	  dwellings	   today.	  Now,	  this	  is	  hard	  to	  establish,	  since	  whether	  developed	  by	  a	  council,	  a	  housing	  association	  or	  a	  private	  developer,	  the	  cost	  of	  redevelopment	  is	  hidden	  behind	  the	  cloak	  of	  commercial	  confidentiality.	   This	  means	   that,	   despite	   our	   Freedom	   of	   Information	   requests	   to	   see	  these	   figures	   on	   which	   the	   demolition	   of	   our	   council	   estates	   are	   founded,	   they	   are	  withheld	  from	  public	  scrutiny.	  	  Fortunately,	   however,	   Simon	   Morrow,	   a	   chartered	   quantity	   surveyor	   with	   29	   years’	  experience,	  was	   engaged	  by	   leaseholders	  on	   the	  Aylesbury	   estate	   trying	   to	   save	   their	  homes	  from	  demolition	  to	  assess	  the	  relative	  costs	  of	  refurbishing	  their	  homes	  versus	  the	  cost	  of	  demolishing	  and	  redeveloping	  them.	  This	  was	  published	  in	  December	  2017	  as	   part	   of	   the	   public	   inquiry	   into	   the	   justification	   for	   Southwark	   council	   issuing	  Compulsory	  Purchase	  Orders	  on	  the	  leaseholders’	  homes.	  Consequently,	  we	  have	  access	  to	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  new	  build	  on	  an	  estate	  redevelopment.	  His	  estimates	  are	  based	   on	   figures	   provided	   by	   the	   council’s	   private	   development	   partner,	   then	   the	  Notting	  Hill	  Housing	  Trust,	  in	  their	  viability	  assessment	  for	  the	  first	  development	  site	  of	  the	  Aylesbury	  estate.	  This	  was	  approved	  for	  planning	  application	  in	  September	  2014,	  so	  Simon	  Morrow	  has	  also	  re-­‐calculated	  the	  figures	  allowing	  for	   inflation	  between	  March	  2015	  and	  December	  2017.	  	  These	  costs	  are	  very	  important	  when	  establishing	  two	  things:	  first,	  what	  proportion	  of	  the	  new	  builds	  on	  an	  estate	  redevelopment	  scheme	  need	  to	  be	  for	  market	  sale,	  market	  rent	   and	   all	   the	   types	   of	   affordable	   housing,	   in	   order	   to	   cover	   the	   costs	   of	  redevelopment;	   and	   second,	   what	   increase	   in	   housing	   capacity	   over	   the	   demolished	  estate	   the	   redevelopment	   has	   to	   achieve	   in	   order	   to	   supply	   the	   sufficient	   number	   of	  properties	   to	  meet	   those	   costs.	   For	   easier	   comparison,	   these	   costs	   are	   represented	   in	  this	  slide	  at	  the	  same	  scale	  as	  the	  different	  government	  subsidies	  in	  the	  previous	  slide.	  
• There	  are	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  breakdown	  the	  enormous	  number	  of	  elements	  that	  go	  into	  a	  new	  development,	  but	  in	  round	  numbers	  the	  cost	  of	  materials	  and	  construction	   alone	   (indicated	   in	   black)	   come	   to	   £212,000	   per	   dwelling.	  This	  might	  come	  as	  a	  shock	  to	  most	  people,	  who	  will	  rightly	  ask	  why	  it	  suddenly	  costs	  so	  much	  to	  build	  a	  home.	  Well,	   it’s	  not	  because	  the	  cost	  of	  timber	  and	  concrete	  has	  gone	  up,	  that’s	  for	  sure;	  or	  because	  the	  new	  developments	  are	  built	  to	  higher	  standards	   –	   as	   the	   list	   of	   complaints	   from	   residents	   in	   estate	   redevelopments	  shows.	   Rather,	   it’s	   because	   the	   profits	   being	  made	   by	   developers	   from	   the	  UK	  housing	   crisis	   are	   so	   high	   –	   with	   the	   four	   biggest	   UK	   building	   companies	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increasing	   their	   pre-­‐tax	   profits	   eightfold	   in	   the	   past	   six	   years	   alone	   –	   that	  builders	  can	  charge	  equivalent	  profit	  margins	  from	  them.	  
• Professional	  fees	  for	  contractors	  and	  Section	  106	  agreements	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey)	   –	   the	   latter	   covering	   the	   developer’s	   contribution	   to	   the	   council	   for	  affordable	   housing	   provision,	   compensation	   for	   loss	   of	   open	   space	   and	  mitigation	  for	  impact	  on	  the	  area	  –	  come	  to	  £38,500	  per	  dwelling.	  
• Marketing	   and	   Letting	   Fees	   (indicated	   in	   mid-­‐grey),	   relating	   to	   the	   sale	   and	  rental	  of	  the	  properties,	  come	  to	  £7,500	  per	  dwelling.	  
• Finance	   (indicated	   in	   light	   grey),	   which	   largely	   consists	   of	   the	   interest	   on	   the	  loans	  required	  to	  fund	  the	  scheme,	  and	  taking	  the	  estimates	  used	  by	  Notting	  Hill	  Housing	  Trust	   for	   the	  Aylesbury	   estate	   calculated	  on	   inflation	  up	   to	  December	  2017,	  comes	  to	  £8,000	  per	  dwelling.	  
• And,	  finally,	  developer	  profit	  (indicated	  in	  lightest	  grey),	  which	  is	  ring-­‐fenced	  in	  Notting	  Hill	  Housing	  Trust’s	   contract	  with	  Southwark	  council	   at	  21	  per	   cent	  of	  private	   sales	   income	   including	   car	   parking,	   comes	   to	   £39,000	   per	   dwelling.	  Interestingly,	  this	  is	  just	  over	  the	  £38,000	  in	  subsidies	  the	  government	  is	  making	  available	   for	   most	   forms	   of	   affordable	   housing,	   which	   indicates	   where	   those	  public	  subsidies	  are	  going.	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Residents	  told	  by	  their	  local	  authority	  that	  their	  homes	  are	  about	  to	  be	  demolished	  and	  redeveloped	  are	  consistently	  told	  that	  the	  council	  is	  compelled	  to	  do	  so	  because	  the	  cost	  of	   refurbishing	   the	  estate	   is	   too	  high,	  and	  redevelopment	   is	   the	  only	   financially	  viable	  option.	  The	  truth,	  however,	  which	  this	  report	  will	  demonstrate,	   is	  that	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	   is	   in	   reality	   many	   times	   the	   cost	   of	   refurbishment.	   This	   has	  consequences	  for	  how	  any	  estate	  regeneration	  that	  begins	  by	  demolishing	  the	  existing	  estate	  will	   turn	   out	   in	   terms	   of	   housing	   density	   and,	  more	   importantly,	   the	   tenure	   of	  that	  new	  housing.	  
• High	  as	  the	  cost	  of	  £305,000	  per	  new-­‐build	  dwelling	  (indicated	  in	  granite)	  might	  seem,	   in	   fact	   the	  cost	  of	  redevelopment	  doesn’t	  stop	  there.	  Or	  rather,	   it	  doesn’t	  start	   there;	   because,	   of	   course,	   before	   the	   council	   can	   construct	   a	   new	  development	  they	  need	  to	  demolish	  the	  existing	  one.	  The	  cost	  of	  redevelopment,	  therefore,	  starts	  with	  the	  cost	  of	  demolition.	  	  To	  most	  of	  us,	  perhaps,	  demolition	  conjures	  up	   images	  of	  a	  crane	  and	  a	  wrecking	  ball	  easily	   knocking	   down	   concrete	   walls.	   In	   reality	   the	   process	   is	   far	   longer	   and	   more	  complicated	   than	   this,	   and	  consequently	  more	  expensive.	  Anyone	  who	  has	  visited	   the	  Aylesbury	  estate	  and	  seen	  the	  scaffolding	  that	  has	  encased	  the	  12-­‐storey	  blocks	  for	  the	  last	  few	  years	  as	  they	  are	  gradually	  dismantled	  will	  have	  a	  better	  idea	  of	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  demolish	  multi-­‐storey	  reinforced	  concrete	  buildings	  and	  dispose	  of	  the	  rubble.	  The	  cost	  of	  demolition	  varies	  depending	  on	  the	  size	  and	  height	  of	  the	  individual	  buildings,	  their	  means	  of	  construction	  and	  the	  ease	  of	  access	  to	  them.	  As	  is	  typically	  the	  case	  with	  post-­‐war	   estates,	   the	   presence	   of	   asbestos	   in	   the	   buildings	   dramatically	   slows	   the	   process	  and	  increases	  the	  cost	  of	  removing	  it.	  In	  a	  report	  on	  the	  Aylesbury	  estate	  regeneration	  dated	   September	   2016,	   Southwark	   council	   allocated	   funds	   for	   the	   demolition	   of	   four	  housing	  blocks	  on	  the	  First	  Development	  Site	   to	   the	  sum	  of	  £16,800,000.	  Allowing	   for	  inflation,	  this	  came	  to	  about	  £30,000	  per	  dwelling.	  However,	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  demolition	  also	   includes	   the	  demolition	  of	   the	  estate’s	  commercial,	  communal	  and	  administrative	  buildings,	   as	  well	   as	   its	  public	   spaces,	   sports	  grounds,	   carparks	  and	  garages,	  plus	  any	  below-­‐ground	  demolition.	  	  
• Because	  of	  this,	  according	  to	  a	  report	  by	  Professor	  Anne	  Power,	  Head	  of	  Housing	  and	   Communities	   at	   the	   London	   School	   of	   Economics,	   the	   average	   cost	   of	  demolition	  is	  closer	  to	  £50,000	  per	  dwelling	  (indicated	  in	  sand).	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On	   any	   estate	   regeneration	   scheme	   that	   begins	   by	   demolishing	   the	   existing	   estate,	  therefore,	   to	   the	  £305,000	  cost	  per	  dwelling	  built	  needs	  to	  be	  added	  the	  £50,000	  cost	  per	  home	  demolished.	  	  In	  comparison	  to	   this	  already	   large	  –	  but,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  not	  yet	  complete	  sum	  –	  the	  cost	  of	   refurbishing	   those	  homes,	   rather	   than	  demolishing	   them,	   is	   tiny.	  This	  depends	  on	   the	   size	   of	   the	   home,	   but	   according	   to	   the	   estimates	   by	   Simon	   Morrow	   for	   the	  Aylesbury	   estate,	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   homes	   up	   to	   the	   Decent	   Homes	   Standard	   plus,	   it	  ranges	  between	  £20,000	   for	  a	  1	  and	  2-­‐bedroom	  homes	  and	  £25,500	   for	  a	  3-­‐bedroom	  home.	  This	  standard	  includes	  new	  kitchens,	  new	  bathrooms,	  new	  heating	  systems,	  new	  boilers,	  re-­‐wiring,	  new	  windows	  and	  external	  doors	  and	  new	  painting	  finishes.	  	  Full	   refurbishment,	   however,	   also	   includes	   external	   mechanical	   and	   electrical	   works,	  including	  new	  pipework,	  gas	  installation,	  door	  entry	  systems,	  fire-­‐stopping	  and	  repairs	  to	  communal	  areas;	  external	  refurbishment	  costs	  and	  external	  works	  and	  preliminaries,	  including	  new	  roofing	  and	  scaffolding.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  refurbished	  estate	  will	  be	  in	  better	   condition	   than	   it	   ever	   was	   and	   have	   better	   facilities	   than	   it	   ever	   had.	   To	   this	  needs	   to	  be	   added	  professional	   fees	   and	   a	  10	  per	   cent	   contingency	   fund,	   all	   of	  which	  adds	  an	  additional	  £28,500	  cost	  per	  dwelling.	  
Anyone	  who	  lives	  there	  or	  has	  visited	  it	  will	  know	  that	  the	  Aylesbury	  estate	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	   run	   down	   and	   neglected	   estates	   in	   London,	   whose	   managed	   decline	   –	   in	  preparation	  for	  its	  eventual	  demolition	  –	  Southwark	  council	  has	  overseen	  for	  decades.	  These	  independent	  estimates	  by	  Simon	  Morrow,	  therefore,	  are	  as	  high	  as	  they’re	  likely	  to	  be	  on	  any	  estate	   in	  London,	  and	   in	   fact	   considerably	  higher	   than	   the	  council’s	  own	  estimate,	  which	  they	  made	  in	  2014,	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  refurbishment	  was	  between	  £30,000	  and	  £40,000	  per	  dwelling	  inclusive	  of	  all	  other	  works.	  
• Simon	  Morrow’s	  final	  estimate,	  therefore,	  based	  on	  prices	  in	  December	  2017,	  is	  that	  refurbishment	   of	   an	   entire	   estate	   up	   to	   the	  Decent	  Homes	   Standard	  plus	   costs	   on	  average	  £50,000	  per	  home	  (indicated	  in	  recycled	  paper).	  	  As	  we’ve	  just	  seen,	  that’s	  the	  same	  cost	  per	  home	  as	  demolishing	  the	  whole	  estate.	  It’s	  extraordinary,	  therefore,	  that	  although	  there	  is	  funding	  for	  building	  affordable	  housing,	  at	   least	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   which	   are	   properties	   for	   sale	   to	   middle-­‐income	   households,	  neither	  the	  government	  nor	  the	  Greater	  London	  Authority	  has	  allocated	  funding	  for	  the	  refurbishment	  of	  the	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  our	  councils	  are	  busily	  demolishing	  in	  order	  to	  build	  these	  properties	  at	  huge	  cost	  to	  the	  taxpayer.	  	  Why	  is	  that?	  Well,	  the	  Decent	  Homes	  Standard	  programme	  was	  initiated	  in	  2001	  by	  the	  Labour	  government	  of	  Tony	  Blair,	  and	  between	  2001	  and	  2010	  the	  Labour	  government	  allocated	   £22	   billion	   to	   the	   Decent	   Homes	   Programme.	   However,	   the	   Coalition	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government	  subsequently	  committed	  just	  £1.6	  billion	  to	  the	  Decent	  Homes	  Programme	  between	   2011	   and	   2015;	   and	   since	   then	   the	   Conservative	   government	   has	   stopped	  funding	   the	  programme	  entirely.	  As	   a	   consequence,	   in	   the	   £4.8	  billion	  of	   government	  funding	  he	  has	   released	  under	   the	  programme	  called	  Homes	   for	  Londoners,	  London’s	  Labour	  Mayor,	  Sadiq	  Khan,	  has	  allocated	  no	  funds	   for	  bringing	  existing	  council	  homes	  up	  to	  the	  Decent	  Homes	  Standard.	  










Now	  let’s	  return	  from	  the	  Aylesbury	  estate	  to	  our	  hypothetical	  demolition	  of	  an	  estate	  of	  100	  homes	  and	  its	  redevelopment	  as	  250	  properties	  on	  the	  tenure	  mix	  we’ve	  already	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established	   as	   typical	   of	   estate	   regeneration	   schemes.	   This	   is	   our	   rough	   viability	  assessment	  of	  how	  much	  it	  will	  cost	  to	  redevelop	  the	  estate	  and	  how	  much	  money	  the	  developer	  will	  make	  from	  doing	  so	  over	  a	  10-­‐year	  period.	  
To	  assess	  the	  income	  from	  this	  scheme,	  let’s	  start	  with	  the	  subsidies	  the	  developer	  will	  get	  from	  the	  government	  for	  building	  the	  new	  dwellings.	  
• 25	   dwellings	   for	   London	   Affordable	   Rent	   at	   £100,000	   per	   home	   (indicated	   in	  orange)	  will	  receive	  £2.5	  million.	  
• 25	  dwellings	  for	  London	  Living	  Rent	  at	  £38,000	  per	  home	  (indicated	  in	  yellow)	  will	  receive	  £950,000.	  
• And	  50	  shared	  ownership	  properties	  at	  £38,000	  per	  home	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey)	  will	  receive	  £1.9	  million.	  That’s	  a	  total	  government	  subsidy	  of	  £5.35	  million.	  	  Now	  let’s	   look	  at	  the	  income	  the	  developer	  will	  receive	  from	  rents	  and	  sales.	  This	  will	  vary	   depending	   on	   the	   number	   of	   bedrooms	   in	   each	   property,	   but	   based	   on	   a	   2-­‐bedroom	  home:	  	  
• 25	  properties	   for	  London	  Affordable	  Rent	   at	   £159	  per	  week	   (indicated	   in	  orange)	  produce	  an	  annual	  rent	  of	  £206,700.	  
• 25	   properties	   for	   London	   Living	   Rent	   at	   £213	   per	   week	   (indicated	   in	   yellow)	  produce	  an	  annual	  rent	  of	  £276,900.	  
• 50	   shared	   ownership	   properties	   at	   £1,100	   per	   month	   (indicated	   in	   dark	   grey)	  produce	  an	  annual	  rent	  of	  £660,400.	  
• And	  25	  properties	  for	  market	  rent	  at	  £480	  per	  week	  (indicated	  in	  purple)	  produce	  an	  annual	  rent	  of	  £624,000.	  	  When	  management	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  are	  deducted,	  only	  47	  per	  cent	  of	  affordable	  housing	  revenue	  and	  75	  per	  cent	  of	  private	  housing	  revenue	  is	  income,	  so	  these	  figures	  will	  have	  to	  be	  adjusted.	  It	   is	  in	  sales,	  however,	  that	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  the	  developer’s	  investment	  is	  recovered.	  	  
• Sales	  receipts	  on	  the	  25	  per	  cent	  share	  of	  the	  50	  shared	  ownership	  properties	  at	  an	  average	  of	  £650,000	  per	  dwelling	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey)	  come	  to	  £8.125	  million.	  
• Sales	  receipts	  on	  the	  125	  properties	  for	  market	  sale	  (indicated	  in	  black),	  again	  at	  an	  average	  sale	  price	  of	  £650,000,	  are	  £81.25	  million.	  	  So,	  to	  add	  up	  the	  developer’s	  income:	  	  
• The	  total	  subsidies	  come	  to	  £5.35	  million;	  
• The	  total	  sales	  to	  £89.375	  million;	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• And	  the	  net	  rent,	  calculated	  at	  47	  per	  cent	  of	  affordable	  housing	  revenue	  and	  75	  per	  cent	  of	  market	  rent	  revenue,	  extended	  over	  the	  first	  10	  years	  of	  the	  development,	  is	  £10,056,800.	  











Now,	   let’s	   look	   at	   the	   costs	   of	   this	   hypothetical	   scheme,	   based	   on	   the	   figures	   we’ve	  established.	  
• First,	  the	  demolition	  of	  the	  existing	  100	  homes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  £50,000	  per	  home	  is	  £5	  million	  (indicated	  in	  sand).	  
• The	   construction	   of	   250	   new	   dwellings	   at	   £305,000	   per	   dwelling	   is	   £76.25	  million	  (indicated	  in	  granite).	  	  However,	  as	   I	  said	  before,	   the	  cost	  of	  demolition	  and	  construction	   is	  not	   the	  complete	  cost	  of	   redevelopment.	  Now	  we	  come	  to	  some	  new	  costs,	   the	   first	  of	  which	   is	  what	   is	  called	   decant	   costs.	   This	   includes	   home	   loss	   and	   disturbance	   costs	   at	   £8,900	   per	  dwelling	  and	  decant	  costs	  at	  £3,000	  per	  dwelling	  for	  70	  tenants;	  plus	  disturbance	  costs	  at	  £4,000	  per	  dwelling	  and	  compensation	  at	  £340,000	  per	  dwelling	  for	  30	  leaseholders.	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  These	  sums	  are	  offered	  to	  residents	  by	  the	  council	  in	  compensation	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  homes,	   for	   their	   moving	   expenses,	   and	   above	   all	   in	   order	   to	   compulsory	   purchase	  leaseholders’	  homes.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  paltry	  sums	  offered	  to	  the	  leaseholders	  of	  the	  Ferrier,	  Woodberry	   Down,	   Heygate,	   Aylesbury	   and	  Myatts	   Field	   North	   estates	   in	   the	  early	  2000s	  are	  slowly	  being	  corrected	   to	  more	  accurately	  reflect	   the	  market	  value	  of	  leaseholders’	   homes,	   and	   the	   figure	   of	   £340,000	   is	   an	   average	   drawn	   from	  what	  Lambeth	  council	  is	  currently	  offering	  leaseholders	  of	  1-­‐bedroom,	  2-­‐bedroom	  and	  3-­‐bedroom	  homes	  on	  estates	  the	  council	  is	  intent	  on	  demolishing.	  
• Applying	  these	   figures	  to	   the	  decant	  costs	   for	  our	  hypothetical	  estate	  regeneration	  gives	   us	   a	   total	   cost	   of	   £11.15	   million	   (indicated	   in	   newspaper).	   That	   alone	   is	  considerably	  more	  than	  double	  the	  £5	  million	  cost	  of	  refurbishing	  the	  100	  homes	  up	  to	  the	  Decent	  Homes	  Standard	  plus.	  	  But	   the	   cost	   of	   demolishing	   and	   redeveloping	   our	   hypothetical	   estate	   hasn’t	   finished	  there.	   So	   far,	   we’ve	   only	   talked	   about	   the	   cost	   of	   construction	   of	   the	   dwellings	  themselves.	  But	  although	  new	  privatised	  developments	  lack	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  shops,	  clinics	  and	  communal	   facilities	  designed	   into	  post-­‐war	  estates,	   they	  still	   include	  more	  than	   residential	   blocks,	   with	   concierge	   entrances,	   gyms	   for	   office	   workers,	   private	  gardens	  and	  other	  landscaping.	  
• Under	   the	   category	   of	   external	   works	   this	   comes	   to	   an	   average	   of	   £6,000	   per	  dwelling,	  which	   for	  250	  new-­‐build	  dwellings	   is	  a	   further	  £1.5	  million	  (indicated	   in	  khaki).	  
• Finally,	  as	   in	  all	  development	  schemes,	   there	  must	  be	  a	  contingency	  sum	  set	  aside	  for	  increases	  in	  expenditure	  as	  the	  project	  unfolds.	  This	  is	  typically	  set	  at	  10	  per	  cent	  of	   construction	   costs	   and	   professional	   fees,	   which	   in	   this	   case	   comes	   to	   £7.775	  million	  (indicated	  in	  diagonal	  lines).	  
• Altogether,	  therefore,	  the	  cost	  of	  demolishing	  our	  hypothetical	  estate	  of	  100	  homes,	  of	  building	  250	  new-­‐build	  properties	  in	  their	  place,	  of	  compensating	  existing	  tenants	  and	  leaseholders,	  plus	  external	  works,	  with	  contingency	  funds,	  comes	  to	  nearly	  £102	  million.	  This	  is	  only	  3	  million	  less	  than	  the	  developer	  will	  recoup,	  even	  with	  their	  21	  per	  cent	  profit	  margins,	  in	  the	  first	  10	  years.	  	  It	   should	   be	   borne	   in	  mind	   that,	   in	   our	   hypothetical	   example,	   the	   land	   on	  which	   the	  demolished	   estate	   is	   built	   has	   been	   retained	   in	   the	   ownership	   of	   the	   council,	   and	  therefore	  has	  not	  been	  added	  as	  an	  additional	  cost	  to	  the	  developer.	  In	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  Aylesbury	   estate,	   however,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Heygate	   estate,	   the	   Ferrier	   estate	   and	   the	  Woodberry	  Down	  estate,	  the	  land	  was	  sold	  to	  the	  developers;	  and	  although	  the	  price	  the	  council	   charged	   for	   the	   land	  was	  minimal,	   and	  not	  a	   fraction	  of	   its	  market	   cost	  at	   the	  time,	   in	   some	   cases	   the	   cost	   of	   our	   hypothetical	   estate	   regeneration	   to	   the	   developer	  would	  include	  the	  additional	  land	  cost,	  further	  eating	  into	  their	  profits.	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So,	   what	   does	   this	   mean?	   It	   means	   that	   when	   an	   estate	   regeneration	   proceeds	   by	  demolishing	  the	  existing	  estate	  and	  building	  a	  new	  development,	  the	  cost	  of	  doing	  so	  is	  so	   high	   that	   certain	   outcomes	   from	   that	   redevelopment	   are	   non-­‐negotiable.	   By	   this	   I	  mean	  that,	  under	  the	  current	  model	  of	  estate	  regeneration,	  which	  means	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment,	  the	  housing	  capacity	  of	  the	  demolished	  estate	  will	  have	  to	  be	  increased	  by	  between	  two-­‐and-­‐half	  and	  three	  times.	  But	  it	  also	  means	  that	  properties	  for	  market	  sale	  at	  upwards	  of	  half	  a	  million	  pounds	  must	  make	  up	  at	  least	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  new	  dwellings,	  and	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  affordable	  housing	  provision	  must	  be	  for	  shared	  ownership.	  
This	  in	  turn	  means	  that	  when	  councils,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  regeneration	  process,	  tell	  residents	  that	  they	  are	  all	  going	  to	  be	  rehoused	  on	  the	  new	  development	  in	  ‘like-­‐for-­‐like’	  replacements	  for	  their	  demolished	  homes	  –	  they’re	  lying.	  It	  never	  has	  happened,	  and	  it	  will	  continue	  not	  to	  happen:	  not	  because	  councils	  are	  corrupt	  –	  even	  though	  they	  have	  repeatedly	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   corrupt;	   and	  not	   because	  developers	   are	   greedy	   –	   even	  though	   they	   are	   enormously	   greedy.	   It	   won’t	   happen	   because,	   as	   soon	   as	   a	   council	  demolishes	  a	  housing	  estate	  and	  hands	  the	  redevelopment	  over	  to	  private	  development	  partners,	   the	   financial	   requirements	   of	   the	   market	   mean	   they	   will	   have	   to	   build	   the	  properties	  that	  will	  return	  the	  20-­‐25	  per	  cent	  profit	  margins	  they	  can	  and	  do	  demand.	  If	  they	  don’t,	  the	  figures,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  won’t	  add	  up.	  
It	  would,	  of	  course,	  be	  possible	   to	   increase	   the	  proportion	  of	  homes	   for	  social	  rent,	   in	  our	  hypothetical	  case,	  to	  constitute	  all	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  affordable	  housing	  provision.	  There	   is,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   limited	   funding	   for	   this	   tenure	   type;	   but	   at	   £100,000	   per	  dwelling	   it	   would	   be	   possible	   for	   councils	   and	   developers	   to	   set	   this	   larger	   subsidy	  against	  the	  loss	  of	  extra	  rental	  income	  from	  affordable	  and	  even	  market	  rents.	  However,	  with	  the	  category	  of	  affordable	  housing	  allowing	  demolished	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  Rent	  to	  Buy	  and	  shared	  ownership	  deals,	  this	  isn’t	  what	  councils	  are	  doing,	  and	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  what	  councils	  do	  not	  do.	  To	  a	  target	  completion	  rate	  of	  17,000	  net	  additional	  affordable	  homes	  per	  year,	  during	  the	  year	  2016-­‐17	  a	  net	  total	  of	  7,347	  affordable	  dwellings	  were	  completed	  in	  London,	  less	  than	  16	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  net	  housing	  supply	  of	  45,505.	  Of	  these	  a	  mere	  2,318	  dwellings,	  5	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total,	  were	  for	  social	  rent;	  2,103,	   less	   than	  5	  per	  cent,	  were	   for	  affordable	  rent,	  meaning	  anything	  up	   to	  80	  per	   cent	   of	  market	   rate;	   and	  2,926,	   over	  6	  per	   cent,	  were	   ‘intermediate’,	  meaning	   for	  shared	  ownership.	  Lambeth	  council,	  which	  completed	  a	  net	  total	  of	  1,135	  dwellings	  in	  2016-­‐17,	  completed	  285	  for	  shared	  ownership,	  81	  for	  affordable	  rent,	  and	  produced	  a	  net	  loss	  of	  174	  units	  for	  social	  rent.	  	  	  The	   choice	   to	  make	   between	   two-­‐thirds	   and	   three-­‐quarters	   of	   all	   affordable	   housing	  provision	   properties	   for	   home	   ownership	   is	   not	   a	   financial	   one,	   therefore,	   but	   an	  ideological	  choice,	  justified	  by	  the	  spurious	  notion	  of	  ‘mixed	  communities’	  –	  as	  if	  council	  estates	  aren’t	  already	  home	  to	  some	  of	   the	  most	  mixed	  communities	   in	  London	  –	  and	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the	  equally	  fictitious	  notion,	  to	  which	  successive	  Conservative	  and	  Labour	  governments	  have	  subscribed	  these	  past	  forty	  years,	  of	  a	  home-­‐owning	  democracy.	  It	  was	  this	  myth,	  sold	   to	   council	   tenants	   since	   the	   1980s,	   that	   has	   resulted	   in	   the	   loss	   of	   nearly	   two	  million	  council	  homes	  to	  the	  Right	   to	  Buy,	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  which	  are	  now	  being	  rented	  out	  at	  market	  rates	  by	  private	  landlords.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  fiction,	  imposed	  on	  the	  remaining	  council	   tenants,	   that	   is	   losing	   council	   homes	   for	   social	   rent	   to	   estate	   regeneration	  schemes	  that	  demolish	  those	  homes	  and	  replace	  them	  with	  dwellings	  that,	  one	  way	  or	  another	   –	   through	   Rent	   to	   Buy	   or	   shared	   ownership	   schemes,	   a	   private	  mortgage	   or	  outright	  purchase	  –	  turn	  those	  homes	  into	  private	  property.	  


























So,	  what’s	  the	  alternative?	  
Having	   informed	   residents	   that	   their	   estate	   is	   being	   considered	   for	   regeneration,	  councils	  inevitably	  conclude	  that	  the	  best,	  or	  indeed	  the	  only,	  option	  is	  to	  demolish	  and	  redevelop	  the	  estate.	  In	  justifying	  this	  conclusion,	  they	  typically	  cite	  three	  main	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so:	  
• First,	  that,	  given	  the	  housing	  crisis,	  councils	  are	  under	  obligation	  to	  use	  council	  land	  to	   increase	   the	  housing	  capacity	  on	  existing	  estates,	  and	   in	  doing	  so	  both	   increase	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housing	   provision	   and,	   according	   to	   the	   law	   of	   supply	   and	   demand,	   reduce	   house	  prices.	  
• Second,	  that	  the	  existing	  estate	  has	  reached	  the	  end	  of	  its	   ‘natural	   lifespan’,	  and	  its	  refurbishment	  will	  not	  address	  problems	  the	  council	  has	  identified	  as	  fundamental	  to	  both	  the	  design	  and	  the	  build	  quality	  of	  post-­‐war	  housing	  estates.	  
• And	   third,	   that	   under	   Central	   Government	   cuts	   to	   their	   budgets,	   councils	   cannot	  afford	  to	  undertake	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  existing	  homes,	  and	  that	  only	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  will	  provide	  the	  solutions	  to	  a	  physically	  declining	  estate.	  Now,	   all	   three	   of	   these	   excuses	   are	   fundamentally	   flawed	   in	   their	   reasoning,	   and	   any	  campaign	   to	   resist	   the	   demolition	   of	   an	   estate	   and	   find	   genuine	   solutions	   to	   the	  problems	  these	  excuses	  identify	  must	  begin	  by	  understanding	  why.	  Let’s	  start	  by	  being	  clear	  what	  these	  problems	  are	  and	  are	  not:	  
• First,	   any	   plan	   to	   address	   the	   housing	   crisis	   must	   not	   simply	   increase	   housing	  capacity	   in	   London,	   but	   must	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   homes	   people	   can	   actually	  afford	  to	  live	  in.	  This	  doesn’t	  include	  most	  of	  what	  is	  being	  built	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	   ‘affordable	   housing’,	   which	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   is	   targeted	   at	   middle-­‐income	  households	   making	   between	   £60,000	   and	   £90,000	   per	   annum.	   Still	   less	   does	   it	  include	  properties	  for	  market	  sale	  for	  half	  a	  million	  pounds	  and	  more.	  In	  London’s	  financialised	   property	   market	   inflated	   by	   global	   capital,	   simply	   building	   more	  properties	  for	  capital	  investment	  will	  not	  reduce	  house	  prices	  but	  actually	  increase	  them,	  reproducing	  the	  property	  boom	  that	  has	  created	  London’s	  housing	  crisis.	  58	  per	  cent	  of	  housing	  demand	  in	  London	  is	  for	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  and	  properties	  for	  sale	  at	  up	  to	  £450	  per	  square	  foot,	  which	  is	  lower	  than	  all	  but	  the	  cheapest	  London	  property	  in	  the	  outer	  boroughs.	  This	  is	  the	  housing	  we	  need	  to	  build.	  
• Second,	  post-­‐war	  estates	  built	  from	  reinforced	  concrete	  have	  not	  come	  to	  the	  end	  of	  their	   natural	   lifespan,	   but	   the	   components	   that	   have	  been	   starved	  of	  maintenance	  for	   decades	   may	   have.	   What	   is	   required	   is	   not	   demolition	   of	   the	   few	   remaining	  homes	   to	   have	   escaped	   the	   huge	   escalation	   in	   property	   prices,	   but	   repair	   and	  maintenance	   and,	   where	   necessary,	   improvements	   to	   estates	   that	   have	   typically	  been	   subject	   to	   a	   process	   of	   managed	   decline	   and	   even	   deliberate	   vandalism	   for	  years	   and	   sometimes	   decades	   by	   councils	   intent	   on	   manufacturing	   reasons	   to	  demolish	  them.	  
• And	  third,	  far	  from	  being	  financially	  unviable,	  the	  cost	  of	  refurbishment	  is	  far	  less	  –	  even	  many	  times	  less	  –	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  demolishing	  estates	  and	  redeveloping	  them	  as	  property	  for	  market	  sale	  and	  so-­‐called	  affordable	  housing	  that	  is	  unaffordable	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  current	  estate	  residents.	  	  In	   April	   2015	   ASH	  was	   contacted	   by	   the	   residents	   of	   Central	   Hill,	   a	   council	   estate	   in	  Crystal	   Palace,	   South	   London,	   which	   had	   recently	   been	   placed	   on	   Lambeth	   council’s	  estate	   regeneration	   programme.	  Working	  with	   the	   residents	   over	   the	   next	   year,	   ASH	  developed	   a	   design	   alternative	   to	   demolition	  that	   proposed	   the	   addition	   of	   up	   to	   242	  new	  dwellings	  on	  the	  estate	  without	  having	  to	  demolish	  a	  single	  existing	  home	  or	  evict	  a	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  Together	   with	   the	   West	   Kensington	   and	   Gibbs	   Green	   estates	   in	   Hammersmith	   and	  Fulham,	  Knight’s	  Walk	  in	  Lambeth,	  and	  the	  Northwold	  estate	  in	  Hackney,	  Central	  Hill	  is	  one	  of	  five	  estates	  for	  which	  ASH	  had	  developed	  this	  model	  of	  estate	  regeneration,	  and	  on	  each	  of	  these	  estates	  we	  were	  able	  to	  increase	  the	  housing	  capacity	  by	  between	  35	  and	  50	  per	   cent	   of	   its	   current	   provision.	   These	   figures	   are	   at	   strong	   variant	  with	   the	  infill	  options	  produced	  by	  the	  architectural	  practices	  employed	  by	  the	  landlord	  to	  show	  that	   demolition	   and	   redevelopment	   was	   the	   only	   viable	   option	   for	   increasing	   the	  number	   of	   homes	   required	   by	   an	   expanding	   London	   population.	   On	   the	   Northwold	  estate,	   for	  example,	   the	   infill	  option	  by	  TM	  Architects	   found	  room	  for	  only	  40-­‐60	  new	  dwellings	  on	  an	  estate	  of	  580	  homes,	  while	   the	  ASH	  option	   for	   the	  same	  estate	   found	  room	   for	   245,	   an	   increase	   of	   42	   per	   cent.	   On	   the	  West	   Kensington	   and	   Gibbs	   Green	  estates,	   with	   a	   combined	   housing	   capacity	   of	   760	   homes,	   we	   found	   room	   for	   an	  additional	   250	   dwellings,	   an	   increase	   of	   33	   per	   cent.	   And	   on	   Knight’s	  Walk,	   with	   33	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homes,	   we	   found	   room	   for	   up	   to	   80	   new	   dwellings,	   an	   increase	   of	   242	   per	   cent.	   So,	  although	   every	   estate	   has	   its	   own	   particular	   possibilities	   for	   increasing	   its	   housing	  capacity,	  our	  proposal	   for	  Central	  Hill,	  which	   increases	   its	  housing	  capacity	  by	  51	  per	  cent,	  is	  not	  exceptional	  in	  this	  respect.	  Indeed,	  given	  the	  amount	  of	  land	  on	  estates	  and	  the	   reinforced	   steel	   structure	   of	   their	   concrete	   buildings,	   the	   capacity	   for	   increase	   in	  their	  housing	  provision	  is	  limited	  primarily	  by	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  residents.	  	  As	   a	   principle	   ASH	   never	   proposes	   building	   on	   green	   spaces	   or	   on	   land	   used	   by	   the	  residents	   for	   recreation,	   or	   on	   sites	   that	   infringe	   residents’	   Right	   to	   Light	   or	   block	  valued	   views;	   and	   every	   proposal	   must	   have	   the	   approval	   of	   the	   residents	   affected.	  However,	  when	  most	  of	   these	  post-­‐war	  estates	  were	  built	  London	  was	  experiencing	  a	  population	   decline,	  with	  many	   households	  moving	   to	   the	   suburbs.	   As	   a	   consequence,	  these	  estates	  are	  generous	  with	   their	   space,	  with	  plentiful	  underused	  or	  disused	   land	  that	  can	  be	  reused	  for	  infill	  housing.	  
Above	  all,	  although	  residents	  are	  repeatedly	  told	  that	  their	  homes	  have	  come	  to	  the	  end	  of	   their	   natural	   lifespan	   –	   typically	   identified	   as	   60	   years	   –	   the	   reinforced	   concrete	  buildings	  in	  which	  they	  live	  are	  generally	  speaking	  extremely	  well	  made,	  with	  decades	  of	   service	   before	   them	   if	   they	   are	  maintained	  properly.	   The	  60-­‐year	   lifespan	   cited	  by	  councils	   as	   a	   reason	   for	   demolishing	   estates	   refers	   to	   the	   lifespan	   of	   a	   building’s	  components	   and	   their	   inter-­‐relation	   in	   the	   design	   and	   construction	   of	   the	   blocks.	   It	  doesn’t	   mean	   that	   those	   components	   –	   like	   those	   in	   any	   other	   building	   in	   London,	  including	   the	   far	   older	   Georgian,	   Victorian	   and	   Arts	   and	   Crafts	   homes	   –	   can’t	   be	  maintained	  and	  refurbished,	  with	  the	  out-­‐of-­‐date	  elements	  replaced	  and	  improved.	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  fixed	  lifespan	  to	  reinforced	  concrete	  buildings	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  fantastical	  myths	   peddled	   by	   the	   implementers	   and	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   estate	   regeneration	  programme,	  but	  does	  not	  stand	  up	  to	  professional	  scrutiny	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  demolishing	  them.	  
On	   the	   contrary,	   on	   Central	   Hill	   as	   on	   every	   estate	   ASH	   has	  worked	   on,	   the	   physical	  deterioration	  of	  residents’	  homes	  was	  not	  only	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  maintenance	  but	  also	  of	  poor	  maintenance.	  New	  windows	  fitted	  without	  adequate	  ventilation	  are	  the	  typical	  causes	  of	  the	  mould	  and	  damp	  that	  is	  regularly	  cited	  by	  councils	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  demolishing	  people’s	  homes.	   Irregular	  paving	  is	  often	  a	  consequence	  of	  cleaning	  them	  with	  high-­‐pressure	  water	   jets	   that	  have	  stripped	   them	  of	   their	  mortar.	  Flat	   roofs	   leak	  because	  they	  have	  been	  deprived	  of	  maintenance,	  not	  because	   flat	  roofs	  are	   flawed	   in	  design,	  and	  can	  easily	  be	  repaired	  or	  even	  replaced	  with	  angled	  tiled	  roofs	  –	  as	  ASH	  has	  proposed	  with	  our	  roof	  extensions	  to	  new	  flat-­‐roofed	  blocks.	  Contrary	  to	  what	  councils	  tell	  residents,	  there	  is	  almost	  no	  physical	  deterioration	  to	  an	  estate	  that	  cannot	  be	  fixed	  through	  refurbishment,	  proper	  maintenance	  and	  innovative	  design	  solutions.	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But	   beside	   the	   possibility	   of	   increasing	   housing	   provision	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  maintenance	  and	  refurbishment	   in	  addressing	   the	  deterioration	  of	   the	  existing	  estate,	  ASH’s	   design	   proposals	   also	   address	   the	   third	   excuse	   councils	   give	   for	   demolishing	  estates.	  This	  is	  that,	  due	  to	  Government	  cuts	  to	  their	  budgets,	  councils	  do	  not	  have	  the	  funds	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  necessary	  repairs.	  
This	   is	   where	   we	   return	   to	   the	   financial	   costs	   of	   refurbishment	   versus	   those	   of	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment.	  The	  first	  thing	  residents	  confronted	  with	  this	  excuse	  ask	  councils	  is,	  of	  course,	  where	  the	  rent	  and	  service	  charges	  they’ve	  been	  paying	  on	  their	  homes	   for	   the	   past	   decades	   have	   gone.	   Unfortunately,	   as	   residents	   who	   have	  conducted	  audits	  of	  the	  councils	  have	  discovered,	  the	  answer	  to	  that	  is	  in	  the	  appalling	  financial	  mismanagement	  of	  many	  of	   these	   councils,	   the	  hugely	  undervalued	  deals	  on	  council	   land	  agreed	  by	  councillors	  who	  then	  went	  on	   to	  work	   for	   the	  developers	   they	  sold	   it	   to;	   the	  proliferation	  of	  senior	  council	  officers	  on	  salaries	  between	  £50,000	  and	  £150,000	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   low-­‐paid	   council	   staff	   who	   once	   carried	   out	   the	  maintenance;	  and	  the	  spiralling	  costs	  of	  vanity	  projects	  like	  new	  town	  halls	  costing	  over	  £100	  million	  being	  taken	  out	  of	  Housing	  Revenue	  Accounts	  supposedly	  ring-­‐fenced	  for	  estate	  maintenance.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  which,	  in	  their	  viability	  assessment	  of	  the	  options	  for	   the	   regeneration	   of	   Central	   Hill	   estate	   dated	   4	   January,	   2016,	   Airey	   Miller,	   the	  quantity	  surveyors	  employed	  by	  Lambeth	  council,	  wrote	  that:	  	  
‘An	  infill	   option	   is	   not	   being	   taken	   forward,	   as	   the	   high	   cost	   of	   refurbishment	  
cannot	   be	   funded	   through	   Homes	   for	   Lambeth,	   and	   the	   funding	   is	   not	   available	  
through	  the	  council’s	  Housing	  Revenue	  Account.	  The	  option	  also	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  
council’s	   aspiration	   of	   maximising	   the	   number	   of	   homes	   developed,	   specifically	  
homes	  built	  at	  a	  council	  level	  rent.’	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  model	  of	  refurbishment	  proposed	  by	  ASH	  doesn’t	  rely	  on	  the	  miss-­‐spent	  Housing	  Revenue	  Accounts	  of	  mismanaged	  councils	  like	  Lambeth.	  Instead,	  where	  infill	   and	   roof	   extensions	   are	   possible	   and	   appropriate	   to	   the	   estate,	   and	   with	   the	  agreement	  and	  collaboration	  of	  residents,	  we	  rely	  on	  the	  rent	  and	  sales	  revenues	  from	  the	  new-­‐build	  dwellings	  to	  generate	  the	  funds	  necessary	  to	  pay	  not	  only	  for	  the	  increase	  in	   the	   housing	   capacity	   of	   the	   estate,	   but	   also	   for	   the	   refurbishment	   of	   the	   existing	  homes.	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To	  explain	  how	   this	  works,	   let’s	   look	  at	   the	   figures	  on	  ASH’s	  proposal	   for	  Central	  Hill	  estate.	  Central	  Hill	  has	  476	  homes:	  340	  of	   these	  are	   for	   social	   rent	   (indicated	   in	   red),	  and	  136	  are	  leasehold	  (indicated	  in	  light	  grey).	  As	  I	  said,	  ASH’s	  proposal	  is	  to	  build	  an	  additional	  242	  new	  dwellings.	  We	  estimate	  that	  we	  can	  make	  120	  of	  those	  new	  builds	  available	  for	  social	  rent	  (indicated	  in	  red),	  60	  for	  market	  rent	  (indicated	  in	  purple),	  and	  put	   62	   up	   for	   market	   sale	   (indicated	   in	   black).	   The	   Prime	   Minister	   has	   recently	  promised	  to	  lift	  the	  cap	  on	  councils	  borrowing	  against	  their	  assets	  in	  order	  to	  fund	  the	  building	  of	  new	  council	  homes.	  When	  that	  change	  in	  legislation	  goes	  through,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  reason	  why	  more,	  and	  even	  all,	  of	  the	  new-­‐build	  housing	  couldn’t	  be	  for	  council	  rent,	  as	  they	  were	  when	  the	  estates	  were	  first	  constructed.	  But	  as	  things	  stood,	  we	  were	  still	   able	   to	   propose	   an	   estate	   of	   718	   dwellings,	   a	   51	   per	   cent	   increase	   in	   housing	  capacity,	  of	  which	  460	  are	  for	  social	  rent	  –	  64	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  –	  with	  all	  the	  existing	  social	  rent	  and	  leasehold	  homes	  refurbished	  up	  to	  Decent	  Homes	  Standard.	  This	  is	  the	  ASH	  model	  of	  estate	  regeneration.	  
In	  comparison,	  Lambeth	  council	  employed	  a	  practice	  called	  PRP	  Architects	  to	  draw	  up	  a	  series	  of	  options	  for	  the	  demolition	  of	  456	  of	  the	  existing	  homes	  and	  the	  redevelopment	  of	  the	  estate	  as	  a	  housing	  association.	  Each	  of	  these	  options	  proposed	  a	  huge	  increase	  in	  housing	   density,	   in	   order	   to	   cover	   the	   costs	   of	   demolition,	   compensation	   and	  redevelopment	  we’ve	  already	  looked	  at.	  The	  option	  with	  the	  highest	  increase	  in	  density	  that	  we	  have	  seen	  is	  the	  proposal	  for	  a	  new	  development	  of	  1,530	  dwellings,	  more	  than	  three	  times	  the	  housing	  capacity	  of	  the	  existing	  estate.	  
According	   to	  Airey	  Miller,	   the	   engineering	   company	   employed	   by	   Lambeth	   council	   to	  produce	  a	  feasibility	  study	  for	  the	  PRP	  proposals,	  this	  option	  will	  comprise	  320	  homes	  for	  London	  Affordable	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  orange),	  100	  homes	  for	  Tenancy	  Strategy	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  green),	  and	  109	  properties	  for	  shared	  ownership	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey).	  These	  three	  categories	  comprise	  the	  development’s	  affordable	  housing	  provision,	  which	  together,	  however,	  make	  up	  only	  27	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total.	  Moreover,	  the	  320	  homes	  for	  London	   Affordable	   Rent	   are	   140	   less	   than	   the	   460	   homes	   for	   social	   rent	   in	   the	   ASH	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scheme,	   20	   less	   than	   the	   340	   existing	   homes	   for	   social	   rent,	   and	   £24	  per	  week	  more	  expensive,	  with	   increased	   service	   charges	   and	   the	   loss	   of	   secure	   tenancy	   rights.	   Even	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  100	  homes	  for	  Tenancy	  Strategy	  Rent,	  which	  is	  double	  social	  rent,	  there	  are	  40	  less	  homes	  for	  affordable	  rent	  than	  the	  ASH	  scheme	  has	  for	  social	  rent.	  
But	   to	   pay	   for	   all	   this	   waste,	   the	   new	   development	   will	   also	   have	   246	   dwellings	   for	  market	   rent	   (indicated	   in	   purple),	  which	   is	   three-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   times	   social	   rent;	   and	   an	  enormous	  765	  properties	  for	  market	  sale,	  this	  latter	  tenancy	  type	  comprising	  a	  full	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  entire	  development.	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  in	  its	  increase	  in	  housing	  density	  and	  in	  its	  proportion	  of	  tenure	  types,	  this	  proposed	  option	  is	  very	  close	  to	  the	  hypothetical	  example	  we	  were	  looking	  at	  earlier,	  and	  we	  can	  expect	  a	  similar	  difference	  between	  the	  tenure	  these	  properties	  are	  sold	  at	  and	  their	  use	  as	  accommodation,	  with	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  properties	   being	   purchased	   by	   Buy	   to	   Let	   landlords.	   All	   of	   which	   raises	   several	  questions:	  
• How	   does	   the	   reduction	   of	   340	   homes	   for	   social	   rent	   to	   320	   homes	   for	   London	  Affordable	  Rent	  benefit	  existing	  tenants	  of	  the	  estate?	  
• How	  does	  the	  building	  of	  100	  homes	  for	  Tenancy	  Strategy	  Rent	  and	  246	  homes	  for	  market	   rent	   benefit	   constituents	   of	   the	   borough,	   when	   studies	   have	   consistently	  shown	  that	  the	  primary	  rental	  housing	  need	  in	  London	  is	  for	  homes	  for	  social	  rent?	  
• How	  does	  the	  replacement	  of	  136	  leaseholder	  homes	  with	  109	  properties	  for	  shared	  ownership	   benefit	   those	   residents	   who	   have	   placed	   their	   life	   savings	   into	   their	  council	  properties	  and	  were	  looking	  forward	  to	  a	  financially	  secure	  future?	  
• How	   does	   the	   construction	   of	   765	   properties	   for	   market	   sale	   at	   an	   estimated	  average	  of	  £463,500	  at	  today’s	  prices,	  and	  far	  more	  by	  the	  time	  they’re	  completed,	  benefit	  anyone	  except	  those	  middle-­‐income	  families	  earning	  up	  to	  £90,000	  per	  year	  who	   qualify	   for	   Help	   to	   Buy,	   the	   Buy	   to	   Let	   landlords	   who	   will	   purchase	   these	  properties	   and	   rent	   them	   out	   on	   the	   private	   rental	   market,	   the	   Buy	   to	   Leave	  property	  investors,	  and	  above	  all	  the	  private	  development	  partners	  who	  profit	  from	  the	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  of	  the	  estate?	  
• Finally,	  how	  does	  this	  model	  of	  estate	  regeneration	  do	  anything	  to	  address	  London’s	  crisis	   of	   housing	   affordability,	   when	   all	   the	   facts	   show	   it	   to	   be	   reproducing	   and	  expanding	  this	  crisis?	  	  This	   particular	   option	   by	   PRP	   Architects	   was	   subject	   to	   a	   viability	   assessment	   by	  quantity	  surveyors	  Airey	  Miller	  in	  August	  2016.	  But	  I’ve	  also	  included	  another	  option	  by	  PRP	  that	  was	  assessed	  in	  December	  2016.	  The	  latter	  option	  has	  a	  slightly	  less	  but	  still	  considerable	   increase	   in	   housing	   capacity	   of	   1,201	   dwellings,	   around	   two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  times	  the	  existing	  estate.	  As	  with	  all	  the	  PRP	  options,	  however,	  it	  will	  have	  320	  homes	  for	   London	   Affordable	   Rent	   (indicated	   in	   orange).	   That’s	   an	   unchanging	   given	   in	   all	  Lambeth	  council’s	  proposals.	  What	  changes	  is	  the	  tenure	  of	  the	  remaining	  new	  builds.	  In	  this	  case	  there	  are	  240	  homes	  for	  Tenancy	  Strategy	  Rent	  (indicated	  in	  green),	  80	  for	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shared	  ownership	  (indicated	   in	  dark	  grey)	  –	  which	  will	   leave	  56	   leaseholders	  without	  even	  this	  inadequate	  option	  –	  and	  a	  massive	  561	  properties	  for	  market	  sale	  (indicated	  in	  black),	  47	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total.	  	  Now,	  the	  purpose	  of	  these	  options	  is	  to	  work	  out	  what	  they	  produce	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  housing	  tenure	  but	   in	   the	  Net	  Present	  Value	  of	   the	  development.	  To	  explain	  what	   this	  term	  means,	  in	  their	  viability	  assessment	  of	  these	  options	  Airey	  Miller	  wrote:	  
‘Net	  Present	  Value	   (NPV)	   is	  a	  measure	  of	  how	  profitable	  a	   future	   cash	   flow	   is	  by	  
comparing	  the	  value	  of	  a	  pound	  today	  to	  the	  value	  of	  that	  pound	  at	  a	  future	  point,	  
taking	   inflation	   into	   account.	   If	   the	   NPV	   of	   a	   prospective	   project	   is	   positive,	   the	  
project	   stands	   to	   provide	   an	   increased	   return	   on	   investment	   and	   would	   be	  
considered	  acceptable.	  However,	  if	  NPV	  is	  negative,	  the	  project	  probably	  should	  be	  
rejected	  because	  the	  cost	  of	  implementing	  will	  not	  be	  recovered	  in	  the	  future.’	  	  The	  calculation	  of	  NPV	  is	  a	  very	   important	   figure	   in	  estate	  regeneration	  schemes.	   It	   is	  used,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  real	  estate	  firm	  Savills,	  which	  is	  employed	  by	  just	  about	  every	  council	   in	   London,	   including	   Lambeth,	   to	   establish	   whether	   an	   estate	   should	   be	  demolished	   and	   redeveloped.	   Unfortunately,	   it’s	   very	   unclear	   how	   this	   figure	   is	  calculated.	  	  As	  we	  can	  see	  from	  these	  two	  PRP	  options	  for	  Central	  Hill,	  Net	  Present	  Value	  can	  vary	  considerably,	  with	   the	   earlier	   option	   for	  1,530	  dwellings	  producing	   a	  positive	  NPV	  of	  +£4.87	  million,	  while	   the	   late	   option	   for	  1,201	  dwellings	  producing	   a	  positive	  NPV	  of	  +£11.37	  million,	  the	  highest	  out	  of	  all	  the	  options	  we’ve	  been	  allowed	  to	  see.	  The	  £6.5	  million	  disparity	  between	  these	  two	  figures,	  even	  when	  the	  earlier	  option	  has	  the	  same	  number	   of	   homes	   for	   London	   Affordable	   Rent	   but	   nearly	   200	   more	   properties	   for	  market	   sale,	   seemed	   incongruous	   to	   us.	   Even	  more	   inexplicable	   was	   that	   the	   August	  option	  closest	  in	  numbers	  (1,268	  dwellings)	  to	  the	  December	  option	  (1,201	  dwellings)	  proposed	   the	   same	   320	   homes	   for	   London	   Affordable	   Rent,	   109	   shared	   equity	  properties	   (a	   forerunner	   to	   shared	   ownership	   deals,	   subsequently	   dropped	   when	  councils	   discovered	   they	  were	  not	   legally	  permitted	   to	   offer	   equity)	   instead	  of	   80	   for	  shared	   ownership,	   100	   dwellings	   for	   Tenancy	   Strategy	   Rent	   instead	   of	   240,	   and	   556	  properties	   for	   private	   sale	   for	   561.	   And	   yet	   while	   the	   December	   option	   for	   1,201	  dwellings,	  according	  to	  Airey	  Miller,	  has	  a	  positive	  NPV	  of	  +£11.37	  million,	  the	  August	  option	  of	  1,268	  dwellings	  has	  a	  positive	  NPV	  of	  just	  +£2.9	  million.	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  Such	   variations	   and	   incongruities	   suggested	   the	   figures	   in	   the	  December	   report	   have	  been	  miscalculated	  at	  best,	  or	  manipulated	  to	  fit	  into	  a	  predetermined	  conclusion.	  This	  was	   important	   to	   us,	   not	   only	   because	   it	  was	   on	   these	   figures	   that	   the	   homes	   of	   456	  households	  on	  the	  Central	  Hill	  estate	  will	  be	  demolished,	  but	  because	  Airey	  Miller	  had	  also	  undertaken	  a	  viability	  assessment	  of	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  for	  Central	  Hill,	  which	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  residents	  we	  had	  submitted	  to	  Lambeth	  council	  for	  their	  consideration.	  	  To	   start	  with,	   Airey	  Miller	   produced	   two	   viability	   studies	   of	   the	  ASH	   report,	   the	   first	  dated	  27	  June	  2016,	  the	  second	  dated	  23	  August	  2016,	  and	  these,	  like	  their	  reports	  on	  the	  PRP	  proposals,	   contained	  huge	  variations	   in	   the	  calculated	  NPV.	  The	  difference	   to	  the	  PRP	  proposals	  is	  that	  here	  the	  variations	  weren’t	  between	  different	  options,	  or	  even	  between	  comparable	  options,	  but	  between	  exactly	  the	  same	  ASH	  proposals.	  
On	   the	   calculation	   of	   the	   97	   roof	   extension	   homes	   we	   proposed	   (in	   fact	   we	   only	  proposed	  68,	  so	  even	  this	  figure	  is	  incorrect),	  the	  June	  report	  arrives	  at	  a	  positive	  NPV	  of	  +£789,187	  on	  a	  Gross	  Revenue	  Value	  after	  60	  years	  of	  £155.4	  million.	  However,	  two	  months	  later	  the	  same	  number	  of	  dwellings,	  calculated	  on	  exactly	  the	  same	  number	  for	  private	  rent	  and	  council	  rent,	  now	  produced	  a	  negative	  NPV	  of	  –£9,418,763	  on	  a	  Gross	  Revenue	   Value	   of	   £107.8	   million.	   That’s	   an	   extraordinary	   loss	   of	   over	   £97,000	   per	  dwelling,	  which,	  since	  our	  own	  quantity	  surveyor	  estimated	  these	  prefabricated,	   light-­‐weight	  timber	  roof	  extensions	  would	  only	  cost	  £115,000	  each	  to	  construct	  and	  lift	  into	  place,	   must	   represent	   a	   new	   low	   in	   value	   for	   money,	   and	   a	   completely	   unexplained	  reduction	  in	  revenue	  of	  £47.6	  million.	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  But	   the	   incongruities	   in	   the	   calculations	   don’t	   stop	   there.	   The	   NPV	   of	   a	   proposal	   is	  calculated	   not	   only	   on	   sales	   of	   properties	   but	   also	   on	   what	   percentage	   of	   rental	  revenues	   can	   go	   towards	   capitalisation	   for	   the	   project.	   On	   an	   estimated	   open	  market	  value	   of	   £624.00	  per	   square	   foot,	   the	   figures	   for	   the	  ASH	  proposal	   assumed	  by	  Airey	  Miller	  were	  between	  61.27	  per	  cent	  and	  76.92	  per	  cent	   for	  market	  rent,	  and	  between	  27.66	   per	   cent	   and	   45.40	   per	   cent	   for	   affordable	   rents,	   the	   range	   expressing	   the	  difference	   between	   1-­‐,	   2-­‐,	   3-­‐	   and	   4-­‐bedroom	   homes.	   By	   contrast,	   the	   percentages	  assumed	   for	   the	   PRP	   schemes	   were	   between	   70.53	   per	   cent	   and	   82.01	   per	   cent	   for	  private	  rent,	  and	  between	  39.90	  per	  cent	  and	  54.47	  per	  cent	  for	  affordable	  rents.	  This	  means	  that,	  in	  assessing	  the	  financial	  viability	  of	  the	  PPR	  schemes	  over	  that	  of	  the	  ASH	  schemes,	  Airey	  Miller	   assumed	  between	  5.09	  over	   cent	   and	  9.26	  per	   cent	  more	  gross	  rent	  from	  private	  rentals,	  and	  between	  8.93	  per	  cent	  and	  12.24	  per	  cent	  from	  affordable	  housing	  rentals,	  towards	  the	  provision	  of	  capital	  for	  the	  respective	  schemes.	  Despite	  our	  repeated	  requests	  for	  clarification,	  Lambeth	  council	  refused	  to	  give	  us	  any	  explanation	  for	  these	  differences.	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  Given	  the	  randomness	  of	  the	  figures	  on	  which	  the	  Airey	  Miller	  calculations	  were	  made,	  it	   wasn’t	   surprising,	   therefore,	   that	   in	   the	   same	   report	   of	   August	   2016	   the	   ASH	  proposals	   for	   the	   whole	   scheme,	   on	   a	   cost	   estimate	   of	   £184.6	   million,	   was	   given	   a	  negative	  NPV	  of	  –£26,557,743,	  while	  the	  PRP	  option	  for	  1,530	  new	  dwellings	  was	  given	  a	  positive	  NPV	  of	  +£4,871,189.	  It	  was	  based	  on	  these	  figures	  that	  Lambeth	  council	  was	  able	   to	   reject	   our	   proposals	   as	   financially	   unviable,	   and	   go	   ahead	  with	   their	   plans	   to	  demolish	  and	  redevelop	  Central	  Hill	  estate.	  So	  how	  did	  they	  do	  it?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Well,	   when	   we	   looked	   at	   the	   viability	   assessments	   by	   Airey	   Miller	   we	   found	   the	  following	   financial	   discrepancies	   between	   how	   they	   calculated	   the	   negative	   NPV	   of	   –£26.56	  million	   for	   the	  ASH	   scheme	   (indicated	   in	   red)	   and	   the	  positive	  NPV	  of	   +£4.87	  million	  for	  the	  PRP	  scheme	  (indicated	  in	  black):	  
• On	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  Airey	  Miller	  imposed	  a	  40	  per	  cent	  social	  rent	  requirement	  on	  new	  builds	  alone,	  not	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  estate	  (for	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  provides	  64	  per	  cent	  social	  rent);	  while	  on	  the	  PRP	  proposals	  there	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was	  only	  27-­‐40	  per	  cent	  affordable	  housing,	  including	  Tenancy	  Strategy	  Rent	  and	  shared	  ownership	  deals,	  on	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  new	  development.	  
• On	   the	  ASH	  proposal	  0	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  new	  builds	  were	   capitalised	   for	  market	  sale;	  while	  on	  the	  PRP	  proposals	  44-­‐54	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  new	  builds	  were	  assumed	  for	   market	   sale.	   Since,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   funds	   for	   new	  development	   come	   from	   sales,	   this	   alone	  was	   guaranteed	   to	  make	  our	   scheme	  financially	  unviable.	  But	  Airey	  Miller	  hadn’t	  finished	  yet.	  
• As	  we	  have	  seen,	  on	  the	  ASH	  proposal,	  capitalisation	  on	  gross	  rent	  was	  estimated	  at	  35	  per	  cent	  on	  social	  rents	  and	  68	  per	  cent	  on	  private	  rents;	  while	  on	  the	  PRP	  proposals	   capitalisation	  was	   at	   47	  per	   cent	   affordable	   and	  75	  per	   cent	   private	  rents.	  
• But	  in	  addition	  to	  this	  difference,	  on	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  capitalisation	  was	  on	  the	  242	  new	  build	   rents	   alone,	   not	   on	   the	  340	   existing	   rents,	   as	   if	   current	   tenants	  would	   no	   longer	   be	   paying	   rent	   to	   the	   council;	   while	   on	   the	   PRP	   proposals,	  capitalisation	  was	  on	  all	  new	  build	  rents.	  
• On	   the	   ASH	   proposal	   the	   £184.6	  million	   cost	   of	   the	   scheme	  was	   estimated	   at	  £100.6	   million	   over	   its	   £84	   million	   estimate	   by	   our	   independent	   quantity	  surveyor,	  an	  impossible	  to	  justify	  increase;	  while	  on	  the	  PRP	  proposals	  the	  £22.8	  million	  cost	  of	  demolition	  was	  omitted.	  
• Finally,	  on	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  there	  is	  full	  disclosure	  of	  the	  financial	  estimates	  by	  our	  quantity	   surveyor,	  Robert	  Martell	  &	  Partners;	  while	  on	   the	  PRP	  proposals,	  the	  financial	  estimates	  by	  Airey	  Miller	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  materials	  and	  construction,	  professional	   fees,	   Section	   106	   agreements,	   marketing	   and	   letting	   fees,	   finance	  and	   developer	   profits	   were	   all	   withheld	   by	   Lambeth	   Council	   as	   ‘commercially	  confidential’.	  	  In	  May	   2017,	   9	  months	   after	   producing	   this	   viability	   assessment	   and	   2	  months	   after	  Lambeth	  Cabinet	   voted	   to	   demolish	  Central	  Hill	   estate,	  Airey	  Miller	  was	   awarded	   the	  role	  of	  Strategic,	  Commercial	  and	  Technical	  Advisor	  to	  Lambeth	  council’s	  major	  Estate	  Regeneration	  Programme	  on	  a	  five-­‐year,	  £6	  million	  plus	  contract.	  	  This	   teaches	   us	   an	   important	   lesson,	  which	   residents	   facing	   the	   regeneration	   of	   their	  estate	  should	  learn	  and	  never	  forget.	  This	   is	  never	  to	  trust	  anything	  the	  council	  hands	  them	   as	   a	   document	   produced	   by	   ‘independent’	   professionals.	   If	   professionals	   are	  contracted	  by	  the	  council	  they	  are	  not	  independent,	  and	  the	  impossible	  to	  ignore	  story	  to	  come	  out	  of	  London’s	  estate	  regeneration	  programme	  is	  that	  professionals	  –	  whether	  developers,	   architects,	   engineers	   or	   consultants	   –	   will	   engage	   in	   professional	  malpractice	   in	  order	  to	  win	  commissions	  and	   justify	   the	  plans	  of	  councils	   to	  demolish	  estates	   whose	   land	   they	   want	   to	   redevelop.	   From	   council	   and	   management	   to	  contractor	   and	   manufacturer,	   the	   level	   of	   professional	   malpractice	   at	   every	   level	   of	  responsibility	  revealed	  by	   the	  man-­‐made	  disaster	  of	   the	  Grenfell	  Tower	   fire	  is	  not	   the	  exception	   but	   the	   rule.	   But	   the	   fatal	   refurbishment	   of	   Grenfell	   Tower	   currently	   being	  subject	  to	  such	  scrutiny	  was	  a	  £8.7	  million	  project	  for	  a	  single	  building,	  the	  purpose	  of	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which	  was	  primarily	  cosmetic.	  The	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  of	  Central	  Hill	  estate,	  by	   contrast,	   is	   a	   half	   a	   billion	   pound	   project	   designed	   to	   capitalise	   on	   a	   considerable	  stretch	  of	   highly	   lucrative	   land.	   If	   councils	   and	   contractors	  will	   put	   residents’	   lives	   at	  risk	  to	  save	  a	  few	  hundred	  thousand	  pounds	  on	  a	  refurbishment,	  as	  they	  did	  on	  Grenfell	  Tower,	  what	  will	  they	  not	  do	  to	  push	  through	  a	  project,	  against	  all	  the	  facts,	  when	  there	  is	  a	  £100	  million	  profit	  incentive?	  Airey	  Miller’s	  fabricated	  report	  is	  one	  answer	  to	  that	  question.	   Lambeth	   council’s	   withholding	   of	   the	   figures	   on	   which	   they	   based	   their	  decision	  to	  demolish	  this	  estate	  is	  another.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Part	  Five:	  The	  Costs	  of	  Refurbishment	  and	  Infill	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  drawing	  up	  our	  proposals,	  ASH	  was	  able	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  services	  of	  Robert	  Martell	  &	  Partners,	  an	  established	  company	  of	  quantity	  surveyors,	  who	  produced	  for	  us	  –	  free	  of	  charge	  and	  therefore	  genuinely	  independently	  –	  a	  cost	  assessment	  of	  the	  ASH	  proposal.	  Hardly	   surprisingly,	   given	   what	   we’ve	   seen,	   their	   assessment	   of	   the	   costs	   was	  unrecogniseable	  from	  those	  produced	  by	  Airey	  Miller,	  so	  let’s	  look	  at	  the	  breakdown	  of	  costs	  by	  Robert	  Martell’s	  &	  Partners.	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• Refurbishing	  all	  476	  homes	  on	  the	  estate	  had	  been	  previously	  estimated	  by	  Lambeth	  council	  itself	  at	  £18.5	  million	  (indicated	  in	  recycled	  paper).	  Lambeth	  received	  £23.3	  million	   from	   the	   Greater	   London	  Authority	   funding	   revenue	   of	   2015-­‐16,	   and	   £6.5	  million	  of	  this	  had	  been	  allocated	  for	  Central	  Hill	  estate.	  However,	  because	  we	  want	  the	  ASH	  model	  of	  estate	  regeneration	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  any	  estate,	  we	  won’t	  deduct	  this	  funding	  from	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  refurbishment.	  
• External	   works	   and	   services	   to	   the	   estate	   were	   estimated	   by	   Robert	   Martell	   &	  Partners	  at	  £4.15	  million	  (indicated	  in	  green).	  
• Professional	  fees	  come	  to	  £10.1	  million	  (indicated	  in	  dark	  grey).	  
• A	   standard	   10	   per	   cent	   contingency	   sum	   comes	   to	   £6.13	   million	   (indicated	   in	  diagonal	  lines).	  
• And	   the	   cost	  of	   construction	  of	   the	  242	  new-­‐build	  dwellings	   comes	   to	  £45	  million	  (indicated	  in	  granite).	  At	  £185,000	  per	  new	  build	  this	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  £212,000	  per	  dwelling	  estimated	  by	  Simon	  Morrow	  for	  the	  Aylesbury	  estate,	  but	  this	  reflects	  the	  cheaper	  construction	  costs	  of	  the	  roof	  extensions.	  
• So	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  for	  an	  estate	  of	  718	  dwellings	  is	  £84	  million.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	   this,	   however,	   must	   be	   added	   marketing	   and	   letting	   fees,	   finance	   costs,	   and	  developer	  profit,	  none	  of	  which	  were	   included	   in	   the	  costings	  of	   the	  ASH	  proposal	  by	  Robert	  Martell	  &	  Partners.	   It’s	  difficult	   for	  us	   to	   estimate	  what	   these	   costs	   are,	   as	  we	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  engage	  the	  help	  of	  a	  quantity	  surveyor;	  but	  using	  the	  same	  figures	  calculated	  by	  Notting	  Hill	  Housing	  Trust	  for	  the	  Aylesbury	  estate,	  adjusted	  for	  inflation	  by	  quantity	  surveyor	  Simon	  Morrow,	  we	  get	  the	  following	  sums	  –	  which,	  if	  anything,	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  overestimates:	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• Marketing	  and	  Letting	  Fees,	  given	  that	  half	   the	  new-­‐build	  dwellings	   in	   the	  ASH	  proposal	   are	   for	   social	   rent,	   and	  would	  be	  allocated	  by	   the	   council	   rather	   than	  marketed	  by	  a	  housing	  association,	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  far	  lower;	  but	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  clarification	  from	  a	  quantity	  surveyor	  we’ll	  stick	  with	  the	  figure	  of	  £7,500	  per	  new-­‐build	  dwelling,	  which	  comes	  to	  £1.815	  million	  (indicated	  in	  mid-­‐grey).	  
• Finance,	  at	  £8,000	  per	  new-­‐build	  dwelling,	  comes	  to	  £1.936	  million	  (indicated	  in	  light	  grey).	  
• Developer	  profit,	  given	  the	  cheaper	  cost	  of	  roof	  extensions	  that	  make	  up	  over	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  proposed	  new	  builds,	   is	  once	  again	  likely	  to	  be	  lower;	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  many	  councils,	  including	  Lambeth,	  have	  argued	  that	  by	  carrying	  out	  the	   redevelopment	   through	   a	   Special	   Purpose	   Vehicle	   rather	   than	   a	   developer	  they	   will	   be	   able	   to	   remove	   this	   cost;	   but	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   financial	  information	  from	  those	  councils,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  sum	  of	  £39,000	  per	  new-­‐build	  dwelling	   used	   by	   Notting	   Hill	   Housing	   Trust,	   this	   comes	   to	   £9.438	   million	  (indicated	  in	  lightest	  grey).	  
• That’s	   an	   additional	   £13.189	  million	   in	   costs,	   taking	   the	   total	   cost	   of	   the	   ASH	  proposal	  for	  the	  refurbishment	  of	  476	  homes	  (indicated	  in	  recycled	  paper)	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  additional	  242	  dwellings	  (indicated	  in	  granite)	  to	  around	  £97	   million.	   For	   all	   the	   reasons	   listed	   here,	   this	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   too	   high	   an	  estimate	  by	  £10	  million	  or	  more,	  but	  we’ll	  retain	  it	  as	  a	  yardstick.	  	  Now,	  you	  may	  be	  wondering	  why	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  costs	  in	  these	  slides	  are	  all	  pushed	   over	   to	   the	   left-­‐hand	   side.	   The	   reason	   is	   that	   I	  want	   to	   represent	   these	   costs	  proportionate	   to	   those	   of	   PRP’s	   proposal	   for	   the	   demolition	   of	   456	   homes	   on	   the	  existing	   estate	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   1,530	   new	   dwellings.	   Given	   the	   costs	   of	  demolition,	   compensation	   and	   redevelopment,	   we	   believe	   it	   is	   this	   proposal	   –	   or	  something	   close	   to	   it	   in	   numbers	   and	   tenure	   types	   and	   proportions	  –	   that	   Lambeth	  council	  will	  be	  obliged	  to	  choose	  if	  its	  private	  development	  partners	  are	  to	  recoup	  their	  investment	  and	  make	  the	  profits	  they	  demand.	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  As	   I	   said,	   the	   construction	   costs	   of	   the	   PRP	   proposals	   –	   which	   includes	   the	   cost	   of	  materials	   and	   construction,	   professional	   fees	   and	   Section	   106	   agreements,	  marketing	  and	  letting	  fees,	  finance	  and	  developer	  profit	  –	  were	  all	  redacted	  from	  the	  Airey	  Miller	  reports	  on	  the	  financial	  viability	  of	  each	  scheme.	  The	  excuse	  for	  this	  was	  that,	  although	  each	  proposal	  was	  based	  on	  the	  demolition	  of	  456	  council	  homes	  and	  the	  compulsory	  purchase	   of	   136	   leasehold	   properties,	   the	   figures	   on	   which	   the	   viability	   of	   those	  proposals	  were	  made	  were	  judged	  by	  Lambeth	  council	  to	  be	  ‘commercially	  confidential’.	  In	   their	   absence,	   therefore,	   ASH	   has	  made	   our	   own	   estimates	   of	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   PRP	  scheme,	  based	  on	  the	  figures	  we	  have	  already	  looked	  at.	  
• The	   cost	   of	   decanting	   456	   households	   is	   £25.65	   million	   (indicated	   in	  newspaper).	  This	  is	  Lambeth	  council’s	  own	  estimate,	  taken	  from	  some	  of	  the	  few	  figures	  not	  redacted	  from	  Airey	  Miller’s	  viability	  assessment.	  
• The	  cost	  of	  demolishing	  456	  homes,	  at	  an	  average	  of	  £50,000	  per	  home,	  is	  £22.8	  million	   (indicated	   in	   sand).	  As	  we’ve	   said,	  demolition	  costs	  depend	  on	   the	   site,	  and	  Central	  Hill	  estate,	  located	  on	  a	  steep	  hill,	  is	  a	  difficult	  one	  in	  terms	  of	  access,	  with	   demolition	   costs	   likely	   to	   be	   at	   the	   high	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum.	   So	   far,	  therefore,	  before	  a	  single	  home	  has	  been	  built,	  Lambeth	  council	  are	  looking	  at	  a	  bill	  of	  £48.45	  million	  just	  to	  take	  possession	  of	  the	  land.	  
• The	  cost	  of	   construction	   is	  more	  complex.	  Once	  again,	  Central	  Hill	   is	   a	  difficult	  site,	  with	  the	  existing	  estate	  built	  on	  pylons	  driven	  30	  metres	  through	  the	  loose	  soil	   of	   the	   hillside	   into	   the	   bedrock.	   It’s	   likely,	   therefore,	   that	   the	   new	  development	  will	   have	   to	  be	  built	   on	   the	   same	   footprint	   as	   the	   existing	   estate,	  with	  blocks	   tripled	   in	  height.	  But	   taking	   a	  baseline	  of	   £305,000	  per	  dwelling	  –	  which	   includes	   materials	   and	   construction,	   professional	   fees	   and	   Section	   106	  agreement,	  marketing	  and	  letting	  fees,	  finance	  and	  developer	  profit	  –	  we	  need	  to	  add	  an	  additional	  £6,000	  per	  dwelling	  for	  external	  works	  and	  services	  and	  a	  10	  per	  cent	  contingency	  sum,	  all	  of	  which	  comes	  to	  £342,000	  per	  dwelling.	  
• To	   rebuild	   the	   456	   demolished	   homes,	   therefore,	   comes	   to	   £156	   million	  (indicated	   in	  granite).	   So	   simply	   replacing	  what	   is	   already	   there,	   together	  with	  the	   decant	   and	   demolition	   costs,	   comes	   to	   £204.5	   million.	   That’s	   more	   than	  double	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  ASH	  proposal,	  without	  adding	  a	  single	  additional	  dwelling.	  
• To	  match	  the	  total	  number	  of	  homes	  in	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  is	  even	  more	  expensive.	  The	   construction	   of	   718	   dwellings	   at	   £342,000	   per	   dwelling	   is	   £245.5	  million	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(indicated	   in	   granite),	  making	   the	   entire	   scheme	   come	   to	   £294	  million.	   That’s	  three	   times	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   ASH	   proposal	   just	   to	   reach	   the	   same	   number	   of	  dwellings.	  
• To	   pay	   for	   this,	   however,	  we’ve	   seen	   that	   the	   number	   of	   new	  dwellings	   on	   an	  estate	   regeneration	   that	   demolishes	   the	   existing	   homes	   and	   builds	   a	   new	  development	  from	  scratch,	  has	  to	  increase	  the	  housing	  density	  by	  between	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   and	   three	   times	   if	   it’s	   to	  make	   the	   profits	   developers	   demand.	   The	  most	  likely	  option	  Lambeth	  council	  will	  take,	  therefore,	  is	  something	  like	  the	  PRP	  proposal	   for	   a	   development	   of	   1,530	   dwellings.	   At	   £342,000	   per	   dwelling	   that	  will	  cost	  £523.25	  million	  (indicated	  in	  granite),	  with	  a	  total	  cost	  for	  the	  scheme	  of	   £571.7	   million,	   nearly	   six	   times	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   ASH	   proposal.	   Indeed,	   the	  increase	  is	  so	  great	  that	  I	  can’t	  fit	  both	  schemes	  onto	  the	  same	  slide	  at	  the	  same	  scale.	  	  In	  fact,	  if	  we	  go	  back	  to	  the	  Airey	  Miller	  viability	  assessment	  for	  this	  option	  of	  1,530	  new	  dwellings	   in	   its	   report	  of	  August	  2016,	   the	   Indicative	  Finance	  Cost	   for	   the	  proposal	   is	  calculated	  to	  be	  £560.4	  million.	  However,	  this	  left	  off	  the	  cost	  of	  demolition,	  which	  at	  an	  estimated	  £22.8	  million	  brings	  the	  whole	  scheme	  up	  to	  £583.2	  million	  –	  slightly	  more	  than,	  but	  not	   far	  off,	  our	  own	  estimate.	  Given	   that	  we’ve	  had	  no	  access	  whatsoever	   to	  the	   bulk	   of	   those	   costs,	   this	   is	   remarkably	   close	   to	   our	   own	   assessment	   of	   £571.7	  million,	  and	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  our	  own	  estimates	  are	  accurate	  in	  their	  assumptions	  and	  calculations.	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  I	  said	  that	  Robert	  Martell	  &	  Partners	  costed	  our	  proposal.	  What	  we	  haven’t	  been	  able	  to	  find	   is	   a	   quantity	   surveyor	   –	   or	   the	   funds	   to	   pay	   one	   –	   that	  will	   undertake	   the	  more	  laborious	  task	  of	  producing	  a	  viability	  assessment	  of	  our	  scheme	  based	  on	  those	  figures.	  However,	  given	  the	  accuracy	  of	  our	  estimate	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  PRP	  proposal	   for	  1,530	  dwellings	   to	   that	   by	   Airey	   Miller,	   we	   feel	   confident	   that	   we	   can	   produce	   a	   similarly	  accurate	  viability	  assessment	  of	  our	  own	  proposal	  for	  the	  refurbishment	  of	  376	  homes	  and	   the	   infill	   and	   roof	   extension	   development	   of	   242	   new	   dwellings	   on	   Central	   Hill	  estate.	  To	  make	  this	  as	  clear	  as	  possible,	  the	  scale	  of	  this	  slide	  has	  been	  enlarged	  seven	  times	  over	  that	  used	  for	  the	  proposals	  by	  Lambeth	  council.	  
• First	   of	   all,	   subsidies	   for	   120	   homes	   for	   social	   rent	   at	   £100,000	   per	   dwelling	  come	  to	  £12	  million	  (indicated	  in	  red	  diagonal	  lines).	  
• Net	   social	   rent	  on	  460	  homes	  calculated	  at	  47	  per	   cent	  of	   gross	  on	  an	  average	  rent	  of	  £140	  per	  week	  for	  the	  first	  25	  years	  is	  £39.35	  million	  (indicated	  in	  red).	  
• Net	  market	   rent	  on	  60	  homes	  calculated	  at	  75	  per	  cent	  of	  gross	  on	  an	  average	  rent	   of	   £320	   per	   week	   for	   the	   first	   25	   years	   is	   £18.75	   million	   (indicated	   in	  purple).	  
• Market	  sale	  of	  62	  properties	  at	  an	  average	  of	  £463,500	  per	  property	  is	  £28.737	  million	  (indicated	  in	  black).	  	  In	  the	  first	  twenty-­‐five	  years,	  therefore,	  revenues	  from	  subsidies,	  rent	  and	  sales	  come	  to	  £98.837	   million,	   covering	   our	   cost	   estimate	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   242	   new-­‐build	  dwellings	  and	  the	  refurbishment	  of	  the	  existing	  476	  homes	  at	  £97	  million.	  	  This	   shouldn’t	   be	   surprising.	   Property	   development,	   after	   all,	   is	   a	   lucrative	   business.	  And	  with	  the	  subsidies	  from	  the	  Greater	  London	  Authority	  and	  the	  extraordinarily	  high	  prices	  of	  London	  property,	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  to	  generate	  the	  funds	  to	  build	  the	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	  that	  is	  the	  highest	  demand	  rental	  housing	  in	  London;	  but	  only	  when	  they	  are	  built	  as	  part	  of	  an	  existing	  estate,	  not	  on	  the	  ruins	  of	   its	  demolition.	  Not	  only	  that,	  but	  the	  funds	  they	  generate	  can,	  quite	  easily,	  cover	  the	  costs	  of	  refurbishing	  the	  existing	  estate	  up	  to	  Decent	  Homes	  Standard	  plus,	  making	  the	  homes	  better	  than	  they	  ever	  were,	  and	  assuring	  their	  continued	  service	  for	  many	  years	  to	  come	  as	  council	  homes	  for	  social	  rent	   for	   the	  communities	   they	  house.	  We’ve	  written	  elsewhere	  on	  the	  ASH	  blog	  about	  how	   councils,	  or	   the	   communities	   they’ve	   sold	   out,	  can	   circumvent	   Government	  legislation	  and	  raise	  the	  funds	  to	  build	  these	  infill	  homes:	  through	  loans	  against	  future	  income;	  through	  setting	  up	  a	  Community	  Land	  Trust,	  a	  Community	  Interest	  Company	  or	  a	  Housing	  Co-­‐operative;	  through	  a	  Joint	  Management	  Organisation;	  through	  the	  Right	  to	  Transfer;	   even	   through	   Special	   Purpose	   Vehicles,	   if	   the	   council	   is	   willing	   to	   explore	  these	  options,	  rather	  than	  continue	  to	  be	  the	  willing	  instrument	  of	  property	  developers.	  	  With	  the	  demolition	  and	  disposal	  of	  an	  estate’s	  concrete,	  brick	  and	  masonry	  resulting	  in	  significant	   and	   harmful	   emissions	  being	   released	   into	   the	   atmosphere,	   added	   to	   the	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embodied	   carbon	   already	   locked	   into	   the	   estate,	   Chris	   Jofeh,	   Director	   of	   Arups,	   the	  original	  engineers	  for	  Central	  Hill	  estate,	  has	  testified	  to	  the	  Greater	  London	  Authority	  Housing	   Committee	   that	  any	   benefit	   from	   building	   more	   energy-­‐efficient	   dwellings	  would	   take	   up	   to	   30	   years	   to	   redress	   the	   balance.	   This	   is	   another	   cost	   of	   estate	  demolition	   and	   redevelopment	   the	   councils	   haven’t	   counted,	   and	   which	   can’t	   be	  compensated	  by	   Section	  106	  agreements	  with	  developers.	  Refurbishment	   and	   infill	   is	  not	  only	  the	  most	  socially	  beneficial	  and	  environmentally	  sustainable	  option	  for	  estate	  regeneration,	  it	  is	  also	  –	  by	  far	  –	  the	  most	  financially	  viable.	  The	  only	  thing	  this	  option	  doesn’t	   do	   is	   create	   the	   vast	   profits	   property	   developers	   and	   financial	   investors	   are	  extracting	  from	  London’s	  housing	  crisis.	  	  Until	  ASH	  finds	  the	  help	  of	  a	  quantity	  surveyor	  willing	  to	  undertake	  this	  work	  for	  us,	  or	  find	  the	  funding	  to	  pay	  one	  to	  do	  so,	  we’re	  not	  able	  to	  calculate	  a	  viability	  assessment	  on	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  with	  any	  greater	  accuracy.	  But	  given	  the	  closeness	  of	  our	  calculation	  of	   the	  PRP	  proposal	   for	  1,530	  homes	   to	   that	  by	  Airey	  Miller,	  we’re	  confident	   that	  our	  own	   viability	   assessment	   is	   closer	   to	   the	   financial	   reality	   than	   their	   inaccurate,	  miscalculated,	   fabricated,	   manipulated	   and	   withheld	   calculations.	   Indeed,	   what	   our	  figures	   show	   is	   that,	   over	   a	   longer	   time	   period,	   some	   of	   our	   proposed	   60	   new-­‐build	  dwellings	  for	  market	  rent	  could	  be	  turned	  into	  a	  far	  lower	  rent	  category,	  perhaps	  even	  into	  homes	  for	  social	  rent.	  We	  should	  recall	   that	  the	  viability	  assessments	  for	  the	  PRP	  options	  were	  calculated	  on	  revenues	  over	  60	  years.	  We’ve	  shown	  that	  the	  ASH	  proposal	  recoups	   its	   expenditures	   in	   less	   than	   25	   years.	   Everything	   is	   possible	   if	   councils	   are	  willing	  to	  look	  at	  the	  possibilities,	  rather	  than	  fabricate	  reports	  to	  dismiss	  them.	  It	  is	  to	  show	   that	   these	   possibilities	   exist	   that	   ASH	   has	   developed	   its	   model	   of	   estate	  regeneration.	   These	   possibilities	   become	   radically	   reduced,	   however,	   as	   soon	   as	   an	  estate	  is	  demolished.	  At	  that	  point	  the	  huge	  increase	  in	  the	  housing	  capacity	  of	  the	  new	  development	  and	  the	  re-­‐tenure	  of	  the	  new	  dwellings	  along	  the	  lines	  we’ve	  looked	  at	  in	  this	  report	  become	  inevitable.	  
Demolishing	  and	  redeveloping	  estates	  is	  not	  a	  financial	  necessity	  but	  a	  political	  choice,	  and	  one	  that	  does	  nothing	  to	  address	  the	  crisis	  of	  housing	  affordability	   in	  London.	  On	  the	   contrary,	   as	   the	   figures	   in	   this	   report	   demonstrate,	   by	   demolishing	   our	   council	  estates	   and	   replacing	   homes	   for	   social	   rent	   with	   so-­‐called	   affordable	   housing	   and	  properties	  for	  market	  rent	  and	  sale,	  the	  estate	  demolition	  programme	  is	  expanding	  the	  housing	   crisis	   at	   the	   cost	   of	  the	   increased	   housing	   poverty	   and	   homelessness	   of	   its	  citizens.	  
Simon	  Elmer	  and	  Geraldine	  Dening	  
Architects	  for	  Social	  Housing	  
	  
Illustration	  by	  Clifford	  Harper	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If	  you	  would	  like	  Architects	  for	  Social	  Housing	  to	  present	  a	  shorter	  version	  of	  this	  report	  
with	   the	   accompanying	   slides	   to	   your	   group,	   campaign,	   Tenants	   and	   Residents	  
Association,	   organisation	   or	   department,	   please	   contact	   us	  
at:	  info@architectsforsocialhousing.co.uk.	  	  
Architects	   for	   Social	   Housing	   is	   a	   Community	   Interest	   Company	   (CIC).	   Although	   we	   do	  
occasionally	   receive	   minimal	   fees	   for	   our	   design	   work,	   the	   majority	   of	   what	   we	   do	   is	  
unpaid	  and	  we	  have	  no	   source	   of	   public	   funding.	   If	   you	  would	   like	   to	   support	   our	  work	  
financially,	  please	  make	  a	  donation	  through	  PayPal:	  	  	   	  	  
	  
Appendix	  	  
ASH	  Policy	  Proposals	  on	  Estate	  Regeneration	  	  
1. When	  proposing	  an	  estate	  regeneration	  scheme,	   a	  Registered	  Provider	  of	  Social	  Housing	   (RP)	  and	   their	  Private	   Investment	  Partners	  must	   set	  aside	  sufficient	   funds	  for	   a	   refurbishment	   and	   infill	   option	   to	   be	   developed	   up	   to	   feasibility-­‐study	   stage.	  This	  option	  must	  be	  designed,	  assessed	  and	  costed	  by	  a	  team	  of	  architects,	  engineers	  and	  quantity	  surveyors	  independent	  from	  the	  team	  given	  the	  brief	  for	  the	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  option.	  	  
2. This	  independent	  team	  must	  be	  given	  funds,	  from	  the	  RP	  and	  Investment	  Partners	  implementing	  the	  scheme	  and/or	  the	  Greater	  London	  Authority	  (GLA),	  to	  produce	  an	  impact	  assessment	  of	  the	  social,	  financial	  and	  environmental	  costs	  of	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	   for	   existing	   residents,	   the	   local	   community	   and	   the	   landlord.	   The	  findings	   of	   this	   assessment	   must	   be	   overseen	   and	   verified	   by	   an	   independent	  supervisor,	  and	  made	  public	  before	  any	  resident	  ballot	  is	  held	  on	  regeneration.	  	  
3. Enforceable	   target	   requirements	   must	   be	   set	   in	   GLA	   policy	   defining	   what	   an	  estate	  regeneration	  scheme	  is	  required	  to	  meet	  before	  receiving	  either	  GLA	  funding	  or	   local	   authority	  planning	  permission.	  These	   targets	  must	  be	  written	  not	   in	  vague	  phrases	  about	   ‘like-­‐for-­‐like’	   replacement	  of	  homes,	   residents’	   financially	   contingent	  ‘Right	  to	  Return’	  to	  them,	  or	  undefined	  proportions	  of	  promised	  ‘affordable	  housing’,	  but	  in	  non-­‐negotiable,	  clearly	  defined	  numbers,	  proportions,	  tenures	  and	  rent	  levels	  that	   are	  not	   subject	   to,	   for	   example,	   the	   future	   viability	   assessments	   of	   Investment	  Partners.	  	  
4. If	   an	   estate	   community	   votes	   against	   a	   proposed	   demolition	   and	  
redevelopment	  scheme,	  the	  RP	  must	  carry	  out	  the	  refurbishment	  and	  continue	  (or	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where	  appropriate	  restart)	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  estate	  at	  the	  very	  least.	  Where	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  the	  funding	  for	  this	  refurbishment,	  and	  with	  the	  agreement	  of	  residents,	  the	   RP	   should	   implement	   the	   infill	   housing	   produced	   by	   the	   independent	   team	  employed	   to	  develop	   this	   option.	   In	   this	  way	   residents	   cannot	  be	  presented	  with	   a	  choice	  between	  the	  demolition	  of	  their	  estate	  and	  its	  managed	  decline.	  	  
5. The	  London	  Mayor	  must	  allocate	  sufficient	  funds	  for	  estate	  refurbishment	  and	  
infill	   (which	   at	   present	   are	   entirely	   lacking)	   through	   his	   Homes	   for	   Londoners	  programme.	   If	   residents	  vote	   for	   this	  option	   these	   funds	  must	  be	  made	  available	   to	  them,	   either	   working	   in	   tandem	  with	   the	   council	   or	   through	   the	   various	   forms	   of	  resident-­‐managed	  and	  community-­‐led	  models	  being	  explored	  by	  residents	  who	  have	  lost	  confidence	  in	  councils	  that	  are	  implementing	  the	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  of	  their	  homes	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  their	  Investment	  Partners.	  	  
	  
